In late March 2025, as Indian Air Force (IAF) transport aircraft delivered humanitarian aid to earthquake-stricken Myanmar, pilots encountered a sophisticated electronic threat in the form of GPS spoofing. This comprehensive analysis examines the incident, identifies the likely perpetrators, and explores the broader implications of this emerging form of electronic warfare deployed against aircraft conducting humanitarian missions.

The Earthquake Response And Electronic Interference

On March 29, 2025, India launched humanitarian operations to assist Myanmar following a devastating 7.7 magnitude earthquake. The IAF deployed multiple C-130J Super Hercules and C-17 Globemaster aircraft to deliver critical relief materials, field hospitals, and rescue teams to the affected regions. However, during these missions, IAF pilots reported significant GPS interference while operating in Myanmar's airspace, forcing them to switch to backup navigation systems. This electronic interference was identified as GPS spoofing, a cyber attack technique that generates false GPS signals to mislead navigation equipment, creating significant risks to aircraft operations.

The first C-130J aircraft delivering aid on March 29 specifically reported GPS signal tampering while in Myanmar's airspace, with subsequent missions experiencing similar issues. According to defence sources, the majority of the six military transport aircraft deployed by India experienced these anomalies, triggering serious security concerns as pilots were forced to rely on alternative navigation methods.

The Technical Nature of The Attack

GPS spoofing represents a sophisticated form of electronic warfare that goes beyond simple signal jamming. Spoofing attacks involve broadcasting counterfeit GPS signals that trick aircraft systems into calculating incorrect positions. This form of cyber intrusion can cause altitude mismatches, erratic location shifts, and even the temporary disappearance of pre-designated drop zones from navigation systems.

When confronted with these anomalies, IAF pilots immediately activated their backup inertial navigation system (INS), which operates independently of GPS signals. Additionally, they employed TACAN-based navigation, terrain-following radar, and encrypted SATCOM channels to ensure operational integrity and mission success despite the electronic interference. The IAF later confirmed that "strict EMCON (Emission Control) protocols were activated to minimize electronic exposure and prevent further spoofing attempts".

Evidence Pointing To Chinese Involvement

While no official attribution has been made regarding the source of the GPS spoofing, substantial evidence points toward Chinese involvement, potentially operating through Myanmar's military facilities. Recent satellite imagery has revealed significant expansion of signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities on Myanmar's Coco Islands, located just 55 kilometres north of India's tri-service base in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Detailed analysis indicates that this SIGINT architecture is being strengthened with direct Chinese assistance, despite Myanmar's military regime officially denying foreign involvement. Security experts believe the Coco Islands base, while controlled by Myanmar, is being built with substantial assistance from China, with Chinese military personnel—particularly technical specialists from the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF)—having access to these facilities.

Myanmar's international isolation has fostered a robust bilateral relationship with China, with the military junta offering shore and offshore facilities for Chinese Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) in exchange for weapons, military equipment, and arms production facilities. This arrangement has facilitated the establishment of Chinese SIGINT facilities not only on the Great Coco Island but also on Ramree Island, Hangyii Island, at Monkey Point in Rangoon, and near the Kra Peninsula.

IAF's Response And Official Position

The Indian Air Force has publicly downplayed the severity of the incident while acknowledging its occurrence. In a statement posted on social media platform X (formerly Twitter) on April 14, the IAF confirmed: "The possibility of degraded GPS availability was published by the Mandalay International airport as NOTAM and all due precautions were put in place to cater for such conditions". The IAF emphasized that its crews "are well capable to handle such unavailability, while ensuring safety of flight and achievement of the designated task or mission".

Despite the electronic warfare challenges, the IAF maintained that "every mission was achieved as planned," highlighting the effectiveness of their countermeasures and the professionalism of their personnel. This assertion was confirmed by the continued success of Operation Brahma, the codename for India's humanitarian mission to earthquake-hit Myanmar.

Global Context of GPS Spoofing Operations

The Myanmar incident reflects a broader global trend of increasing GPS spoofing activities, particularly in conflict zones and areas of geopolitical tension. Similar electronic warfare tactics have been documented in Ukraine, Gaza, and other Middle Eastern regions over the past three years. In one documented case, researchers from the University of Texas at Austin identified an Israeli Air Force base as the source of GPS spoofing that disrupted civilian airline navigation in the Middle East, affecting more than 50,000 flights in 2024 alone.

Security analysts characterise these operations as "grey zone tactics"—covert and deniable actions taken below the threshold of war aimed at harassing or weakening adversaries without engaging in open conflict. As one senior Indian defence official noted, "What we're witnessing is the weaponization of humanitarian corridors".

Conclusion: Strategic Implications And Future Concerns

The GPS spoofing of Indian Air Force humanitarian flights represents a concerning evolution in electronic warfare tactics being employed against civilian and humanitarian missions. The evidence strongly suggests Chinese involvement, operating through facilities established in Myanmar, particularly the expanded SIGINT infrastructure on the strategically located Coco Islands.

While the IAF successfully completed all planned missions despite these challenges, the incident highlights the growing vulnerability of navigation systems to electronic interference and the increasing willingness of certain actors to deploy such capabilities even against humanitarian operations. As one defence expert characterized it, modern conflict has become "a battlefield of bandwidths, not just borders".

This episode serves as a stark reminder of the evolving nature of security threats in the digital age and the critical importance of developing robust countermeasures and backup systems to ensure operational resilience in contested electromagnetic environments. For India, the incident also raises serious strategic concerns about Chinese electronic warfare capabilities being developed in its immediate neighbourhood, potentially threatening both military and civilian infrastructure dependent on satellite navigation systems.

Based on A FirstPost Report