India's Stealth Fighter Race: Can The IAF Close The Growing Air Defence Gap?

The widening stealth fighter gap between India and its regional competitors presents a formidable challenge to India's air superiority and deterrence capabilities. As the United States unveils its sixth-generation fighter and China rapidly expands its fifth-generation fleet, India finds itself at a critical juncture in its military aviation development.
This report examines India's current position in the stealth fighter race, the progress of its indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) program, and potential pathways to close the technological gap amid transformative changes in aerial warfare.
The Growing Stealth Capability Disparity
India faces an increasingly concerning disparity in stealth fighter capabilities compared to its regional rivals. A retired Indian Air Force (IAF) Jaguar pilot, Vijainder K Thakur, recently warned about the potential scenario by 2030 where Pakistan could operate two squadrons (approximately 40 aircraft) of J-35A stealth fighters while China could expand its J-20 fleet to around 400 aircraft. This stark contrast becomes more alarming considering that India is unlikely to have any operational stealth fighters by that time.
The technological advantage provided by stealth aircraft cannot be overstated. These fifth-generation platforms possess significantly reduced radar cross-sections, making them exceedingly difficult to detect and track by conventional means. Moreover, they can deploy advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles without detection by standard radar systems, potentially neutralising Indian defences before they can even register an incoming threat. This capability fundamentally alters the dynamics of aerial warfare and creates a substantial deterrence gap.
In October 2024, Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh made a candid assessment of this technological disparity, acknowledging that the IAF has fallen behind China in key areas, including technology development and production rates of defence equipment. This admission highlights the widening gap between India's air power and that of its northern neighbour, a concerning reality given ongoing border tensions.
The Evolving Global Landscape
The global fighter jet landscape has evolved dramatically in recent years. While fourth-generation fighters like Russia's Su-30MKI and America's F-16 dominated late 20th-century conflicts with their manoeuvrability and heavy weapon loads, fifth-generation fighters introduced paradigm-shifting stealth capabilities and sensor fusion technologies. These advancements have rendered traditional air combat approaches nearly obsolete, with their "first look, first kill" capability allowing pilots to neutralise enemy aircraft before they can respond.
The United States has further accelerated this evolution with the recent unveiling of its sixth-generation fighter, the Boeing F-47, under the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program. Announced by President Trump, this platform incorporates cutting-edge technologies, including advanced propulsion systems, enhanced stealth features, and artificial intelligence integration. Simultaneously, China is already experimenting with sixth-generation J-36 prototypes, unveiled in December 2024, even as it continues mass-producing its fifth-generation J-20 fighters.
India's AMCA Program: Promise and Challenges
The Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft represents India's ambitious indigenous effort to develop a fifth-generation stealth fighter. While the program offers a potential pathway to technological parity, it faces significant challenges that have delayed its progress.
Current Development Status
According to DRDO Chief Dr. Samir V Kamat, the AMCA Phase-I, which will utilise the GE-F414 engine, could potentially take its first flight within seven years after receiving Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) clearance, with the first induction possibly occurring ten years later. This timeline represents a revision from earlier, more optimistic projections. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), which serves as the nodal body for AMCA development, maintains that the first flight will occur by 2028-29, with induction in the 2030s.
However, these projections depend on securing the necessary approvals and funding. The design phase has been completed, but the DRDO is still awaiting CCS sanction after requesting approximately ₹15,000 crore for development costs. This delay in securing necessary funds has become a significant impediment to the project's progress.
Timeline Challenges
Some sources familiar with the program suggest that Dr. Kamat's seven-year estimate might be deliberately conservative to avoid criticism if delays occur. These sources believe the first flight could potentially happen within four years after CCS clearance, perhaps as early as 2028. However, this more optimistic timeline still depends on receiving the crucial CCS approval, which remains pending.
Even with accelerated development, the AMCA would likely not enter service until the mid-2030s at the earliest, creating a significant capability gap during a period when both China and Pakistan will be operating stealth platforms in substantial numbers. This timeline disparity represents a strategic vulnerability for Indian air defence that must be addressed.
Alternative Pathways To Closing The Gap
Recognising the urgency of addressing the stealth capability gap, India is exploring multiple approaches to enhance its air power while the AMCA program progresses.
Foreign Procurement Options
In a significant diplomatic development, President Trump offered India the F-35 stealth fighter during Prime Minister Modi's visit to the United States in February 2025. This offer represents a potential watershed moment, as the F-35 has previously been restricted to NATO members and select key allies. Acquiring this platform would provide India with immediate access to proven fifth-generation technology.
Simultaneously, Russia has proposed co-producing its Su-57E fighter in India. This alternative would build upon India's long-standing defence relationship with Russia while providing access to advanced stealth capabilities. However, both options involve substantial financial commitments and potential geopolitical considerations that must be carefully weighed.
Accelerating Indigenous Development
A high-level committee led by Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh is currently working to finalise a viable production model to accelerate the AMCA's development and induction. This committee, which includes IAF Vice-Chief Air Marshal SP Dharkar and Secretary of Defence Production Sanjeev Kumar, along with top minds from the ADA and DRDO, is expected to submit its recommendations by the end of April 2025.
Streamlining bureaucratic processes, ensuring timely funding, and prioritising critical technological development are essential to maximising the potential of India's indigenous fighter program. The committee's recommendations will likely shape the future trajectory of the AMCA project and determine whether India can meaningfully reduce the stealth capability gap.
Strategic Implications of The Capability Disparity
The stealth fighter gap has profound implications for India's strategic posture in the region and its ability to deter potential adversaries.
Impact On Conventional Deterrence: The technological disparity in stealth capabilities fundamentally undermines India's conventional deterrence, particularly given its geopolitical situation with ongoing tensions with both China and Pakistan. Stealth fighters can penetrate defended airspace, conduct precision strikes against high-value targets, and escape before defensive systems can effectively respond. This capability shifts the strategic balance and potentially emboldens adversaries to take more aggressive postures.
Thakur contends that this widening disparity could significantly undermine India's military deterrence capabilities, creating a dangerous imbalance in regional power dynamics. The ability of stealth platforms to operate with near impunity against non-stealth defences represents a critical vulnerability that must be addressed through both technological advancement and strategic adaptation.
Force Structure Challenges: Beyond the technological gap, the IAF faces significant force structure challenges that compound the stealth disparity. Currently operating with approximately 30 squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42, the IAF already falls short of its authorised capacity. With at least eight more squadrons set to retire over the next decade, this gap could widen further without substantial acquisition efforts.
Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh has emphasised the need to add 35-40 fighter jets annually to address these shortfalls. The long-term vision aims to reach the sanctioned strength and ultimately scale up to 60 squadrons by 2047, but achieving this ambitious goal requires addressing both quantitative shortfalls and qualitative disadvantages simultaneously.
Recommendations For Closing The Gap
Addressing India's stealth fighter gap requires a multifaceted approach that balances short-term capability enhancement with long-term indigenous development.
Near-Term Strategic Options
Expedite CCS Approval for AMCA: Fast-tracking the approval process for the AMCA program would allow development work to begin in earnest, potentially shortening the timeline to first flight and eventual service entry.
Consider Interim Stealth Acquisition: While the AMCA develops, India should carefully evaluate the offers from the US and Russia to determine if an interim acquisition of foreign stealth fighters could provide a stopgap capability.
Enhance Counter-Stealth Capabilities: Investing in advanced radar systems, passive detection technologies, and integrated air defence networks could partially mitigate the advantage of adversary stealth platforms.
Accelerate Domestic Production Capacity: Building robust domestic manufacturing capabilities for advanced aerospace components will be essential for sustaining both current modernisation efforts and future indigenous platforms.
Long-Term Development Priorities
Public-Private Partnership Model: Implementing an effective collaboration model between defence public sector undertakings, private industry, and academic institutions could accelerate technological development and production capabilities.
Focus on Critical Technologies: Prioritising the development of key enabling technologies such as advanced radar-absorbent materials, sophisticated avionics, and indigenous engine technology would strengthen India's aerospace ecosystem.
Bilateral Technology Cooperation: Pursuing strategic partnerships with nations willing to share advanced aerospace technologies could accelerate India's development timeline while building valuable international relationships.
Conclusion
India faces a critical challenge in closing the stealth fighter gap with its regional competitors. The combination of delayed indigenous development, adversary advancement, and existing force structure shortfalls creates a perfect storm that threatens to undermine India's air superiority and conventional deterrence capabilities.
While the AMCA program represents a promising long-term solution, its extended timeline means that India must pursue multiple parallel paths to address the capability gap. This could include interim foreign acquisitions, accelerated domestic development, and enhanced counter-stealth capabilities. The decisions made in the coming months—particularly regarding the AMCA's production model and potential foreign procurement—will shape India's aerial warfare capabilities for decades to come.
The strategic imperative is clear: India must move decisively to close the stealth gap before it widens further. As the nature of aerial warfare continues to evolve with unprecedented speed, maintaining technological parity has become not merely advantageous but essential for national security. Whether through indigenous development, foreign acquisition, or a combination of approaches, India must find a way to field stealth capabilities that can counter the growing threat posed by adversary fifth and sixth-generation platforms.
IDN