Escalating Violence Levels

by Nilesh Kunwar

While there was never any doubt that Rawalpindi is continuing with its proxy war in J&K, recent events indicate a planned escalation in terrorist activities, both in terms of scope and intensity. On the intervening night of February 4/5, an intended terrorist attack in the Krishna Ghati (KG) Sector of J&K’s Poonch district failed when a landmine explosion caused an unspecified number of casualties to members of Pakistan army’s ‘Border Action Team’ (BAT) comprising regular soldiers and terrorists while they were attempting to cross the Line of Control (LoC).

On February 10, an Indian army soldier in the Nowshera Sector of J&K’s Rajauri district sustained gunshot injuries due to firing from across the LoC. The next day, an Indian army officer and a soldier who were part of a patrol along the LoC in Akhnoor district of J&K were killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) blast. Just a day later, Pakistani troops violated the ceasefire agreement by carrying out unprovoked firing on Indian army posts in KG Sector, which evoked a befitting response from the Indian side. Though neither side mentioned anything about this incident, the Pakistan army has (according to reliable sources), suffered significant losses.

On February 14, an Indian army soldier was injured in the Battal area of Akhnoor district due to sniper fire from across the LoC. Two days later, an India army post came under fire in Gulpur Sector of Poonch district from a forested area across the LoC but there were no casualties. Retaliation by the Indian army to this provocative act though short was both intense and appears to be effective as the Pakistan army hasn’t indulged in similar antics again.

The discovery of two powerful IEDs in Shopian and Pulwama districts of South Kashmir on Tuesday isn’t a mere coincidence. It explicitly points at a deliberate effort by the Pakistan army’s spy agency Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), which is masterminding terrorism in J&K in attempting to intensify terrorist violence levels in the hinterland by causing multiple casualties to Indian security forces through use of IEDs. The prevailing situation also increases the likelihood of similar actions like ambushes and attacks on isolated posts.

Besides escalating violence levels, it appears that ISI has also directed its sponsored terrorists in J&K to create an environment of abnormality in the hinterland by terrorising locals. This is evident from the fact that on February 3, terrorists shot dead a retired army soldier and injured his wife and niece in Kulgam district of South Kashmir. On February 16, bodies of two locals who had been strangulated were found in Kathua district, and given the absence of any plausible motive and considering the unusual nature of this twin murder, the authorities haven’t ruled out the possibility of this heinous crime being the handiwork of terrorists.

Pakistan army chief Gen Syed Asim Munir’s reckless and provocative announcement expressing his willingness to fight 10 more wars for Kashmir, though amusing, should not be disregarded as a joke. His emotional outburst that stems from the Pakistan army’s repeated failures to wrest control of J&K nevertheless provides a valuable insight into the fossilised mindset of the Pakistan army and its obdurate belief that the Kashmir issue can only be resolved through the military option. This revelation should serve as an eye-opener to all those on both sides of the Radcliffe Line who harbour the grand ‘aman ki asha’ (Hope for peace) delusion.

Rawalpindi’s Pathetic Defence

On February 14, reports appeared in Pakistani media which quoted “security sources” mentioning that “the Indian military has a long history of unprovoked firing and subversive actions against unarmed civilians along the LoC,” and alleging that “India has been attempting sabotage operations by transporting and deploying IEDs along the LoC.” Claiming that “Evidence reveals that since 2016, India has planted IEDs in 54 separate incidents along the LoC,” this report claims that “Between February 4 and 6, four Indian IEDs were discovered in the Battal Sector and Rawalakot” and mentions a ceasefire violation by Indian army on February 12.

The timing of release as well as the contents of this news report appear to be more of a justification of the Pakistan army’s recent provocative actions along the LoC rather than a fair account of events. Furthermore, by accusing the Indian army for every conceivable crime ranging from false flag operations, fake encounters, smuggling of narcotics and weapons to creating unrest in Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) to “drive a wedge between the public and the military,” the information purportedly provided by unnamed “security sources” reeks of raw propaganda.

The most intriguing part of the report in Pakistani media is the assertion that “Pakistan has also provided evidence of these subversive activities to UN officials stationed in these regions.” The charter of the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) includes investigation of ceasefire complaints and submitting its findings to each party and the UN Secretary General. Hence, if Rawalpindi had indeed provided reliable evidence of the wide array of allegations that it has levelled against the Indian army, UNMOGIP/ the UN would have definitely put New Delhi in the dock.

However, since nothing of this sort has happened, it’s apparent that the so-called evidence that Islamabad claims to have shared with UNMOGIP lacked credibility and hence no action was taken on the same. But then, this isn’t something new. Readers would recall that in May 2017, Pakistan army’s media wing Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) had accused the Indian army of having targeted a UNMOGIP vehicle in PoJK but had to face severe embarrassment when UN Secretary General’s spokesperson bluntly called out Rawalpindi’s bluff by stating “There is no evidence that the UNMOGIP military observers were targeted by the gunfire.”

Will the LoC Ceasefire Hold?

With Pakistan army’s growing belligerence evident from its frequent LoC ceasefire violations and Gen Munir talking about waging 10 wars for Kashmir, many rightly wonder whether the LoC ceasefire will endure. While it’s difficult to predict Rawalpindi’s thought process as it sometimes defies logic, a brief background to how the LoC ceasefire came into effect would certainly help in finding the answer.

The LoC ceasefire proposal was first mooted in Aug 2003 by the then Pakistan President Gen Pervez Musharraf and its prompt reciprocation by New Delhi saw the formal declaration of ceasefire three months later, and despite intermittent spells of cross-LoC firing, the ceasefire has thankfully held out. However, while many may credit Gen Musharraf and the Pakistan army for ushering peace along the LoC out of pure goodwill and even perceive this development as Rawalpindi’s willingness to maintain peace and tranquillity, this inference is absolutely incorrect.

It’s no secret that the Pakistan army revelled in cross-LoC firing till the eighties because permission for the Indian army to retaliate was a tedious process inextricably mired in red tape. Those who had then served on the LoC would recall the staple “Your orders to fire come from New Delhi while we carry the order to fire in our pockets” taunt frequently hurled by Pakistani officers and even soldiers. Luckily, things have since changed and the Indian army is now permitted to undertake immediate and appropriate retaliatory actions.

With this development, the Pakistan army realised that it was at the receiving end. Proof of this lies in the fact that Rawalpindi has consistently refused to disclose details of casualties suffered due to retaliation by the Indian army. In June 2017, the Nawaz Sharif government informed the Senate that Rawalpindi was refusing to disclose details of the fatalities of its rank and file along the LoC citing “national security” concerns and more so because “it didn’t want to show the enemy how many of our soldiers have been martyred.”

Doesn’t this desperate attempt to conceal facts conclusively prove that the Pakistan army has been suffering inordinately high fatalities due to Indian army’s retaliatory fire? Hence, it’s obvious that Gen Musharraf’s 2003 ceasefire offer was an unavoidable compulsion arising from its exceedingly high attrition rates and not due to a genuine desire for peace.

Accordingly, even though domestic compulsions are currently compelling it to take provocative actions along the LoC, Rawalpindi knows very well that continuing this misadventure will extract a heavy price in terms of soldier fatalities. Hence, despite heightened tensions, the ceasefire is likely to endure.

The Indian army must therefore ensure that it continues to deal with any ceasefire violations as well as false flag operations like BAT raids and IED attacks orchestrated by the Pakistan army, immediately and with full force, because unfortunately, this is the only language that Rawalpindi understands!

Nilesh Kunwar is a retired Indian Army Officer who has served in Jammu & Kashmir, Assam, Nagaland and Manipur. He is a keen ‘Kashmir-Watcher,’ and after retirement is pursuing his favourite hobby of writing for newspapers, journals and think-tanks. Views expressed above are the author's own