With US Keen On Military Base And China Eyeing Deep Sea Port, India Must Engage With Bangladesh Smartly
If Bangladesh remains unfriendly to India, Pakistan could also take advantage, including in connivance with China
by Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd)
As Bangladesh comes to grips with the violent protests after the resignation and exit of former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, international power play is unfolding. Hasina has been ruling the strategically located South Asian nation since 2009 and secured a fifth overall term in the one-sided election in January, which was boycotted by the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
China is heavily invested in infrastructure and military hardware in Bangladesh. The US is trying to secure a military base in Bangladesh. India has its longest land border with Bangladesh (4,096 kilometres) that covers its three sides, the fourth being the Bay of Bengal (BoB).
US Favoured A Regime Change
For a long time, the US administration has expressed support for regime change in Bangladesh. They were not very happy with Hasina being pro-India or taking support from China. Various strategies have been tried to get her out of power. Opposition activists had been supported to create a revolt. The US ambassador has been meeting the opposition party, BNP. During the elections, Hasina faced constant criticism from the US over what they called unfair polls.
The US 2023 NDAA Burma Act
Sheikh Hasina recently indicated about a plot by a third country (purportedly the US) that could lead to the division of Bangladesh on religious lines and the creation of a non-Muslim majority country like East Timor. Kuki-Chin rebels are fighting with the Myanmar army to help and promote Christian rebels.
The incorporation of the Burma Act into the US 2023 NDAA had raised strong public opinion in Myanmar that substantial US support would come for the resistance movement in Myanmar. Kuki Chin Province of Myanmar, Chattogram hill tracts of Bangladesh, and Mizoram of India may be the demarcation.
More than one million Chin live in Myanmar, one million Mizo live in Mizoram, half a million Kuki live in Manipur, and tens of thousands of Kuki live in Bangladesh. In addition, due to the ongoing fighting between the Myanmar army and the Chin people, hundreds of thousands of Chin have fled overseas, including 80,000 in the United States”. Hasina felt that it was a wakeup call for the sub-region.
Naval And Airbase At Saint Martin’s Island
The 3 sq km St Martin Island is in the north-eastern part of the BoB, about 9 km south of the tip of Cox’s Bazar-Teknaf peninsula, and is the southernmost part of the country.
The US had reportedly suggested that Bangladesh join the Quad alliance, and there were reports suggesting that they proposed leasing Saint Martin Island for building an air and naval base. The US does maintain military ties with Bangladesh, with both forces engaging in regular visits and joint exercises. Since China is also trying to get closer to Bangladesh, such a US base meant to contain China was not acceptable to them. Some others have suggested that the US actually wants to make Bangladesh a playground to ‘dominate’ India.
However, during a press conference, Matthew Miller, spokesperson for the US Department of State, asserted that the United States has never engaged in any discussions regarding taking control of St Martin’s Island or has any intention to do so.
China-Bangladesh Defence Cooperation
Bangladesh has emerged as an important player in China’s political expansion strategy. Military cooperation between the two in the form of arms supply and construction of military infrastructure has increased in the past few years. During the 1971 liberation of Bangladesh, China had supported Pakistan. But today, Bangladesh considers China a trusted ally.
In 2002, China and Bangladesh signed a “Defence Cooperation Agreement”, which covers military training and defence production. By 2006, Dhaka had emerged as a major buyer of Chinese-made weapons. China praised Bangladesh Hasina for her decision to deny permission for a foreign military base, commending it as a reflection of the Bangladeshi people’s strong national spirit and commitment to independence. Any strategic partnership with Dhaka gives Beijing added leverage to reduce Indian influence and checkmate its forces.
China has emerged as Bangladesh’s highest trading partner, with over $25 billion invested in various projects. After Pakistan, Bangladesh is the second-highest Chinese investment recipient in the South Asian region. China has played a significant role in building bridges, roads, railway tracks, airports, and power plants in Bangladesh. The Padma Bridge Rail Link Project is one of the flagship projects undertaken by China, which connects Dhaka with Jessore through the Padma Bridge. Importantly, a broad array of products from Bangladesh enjoys zero tariffs in China.
China has also continuously enhanced defence ties with Bangladesh and supplies military equipment, which includes fighter jets, battle tanks, and naval frigates, submarines, and missile boats. Bangladesh sources nearly 86 per cent of military hardware from China.
China sold 65 large-calibre artillery systems in 2006. In 2008, Bangladesh set up an anti-missile launch pad near Chittagong Port with Chinese support. In 2014, the two sides signed four military agreements related to setting up military training facilities. In 2016, two Chinese-built 1,350 ton Type 056 corvettes joined the Bangladesh Navy. In the 2018 deal, China agreed to deliver 23 Hongdu K-8 intermediate jet trainers for the Bangladesh Air Force (BAF). Bangladesh imported 36 F-7BGI aircraft from China in 2021. China has played a pivotal role in the development of Bangladesh’s military, naval, and airbases. China is also the main supplier of portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and small arms and ammunition.
A deal was signed in 2017 for two submarines that included training and help to let Bangladesh construct its first submarine base. In 2023, PM Hasina inaugurated a $1.21 billion, six-slot submarine base, built by China at Cox’s Bazar off the Bay of Bengal coast, which will provide safe jetty facilities to submarines and warships.
Bangladesh and China conduct their first-ever joint military exercise codenamed ‘China-Bangladesh Golden Friendship 2024’ in early May 2024. It was to test out United Nations peacekeeping anti-terrorism operations such as the rescue of hostages on buses and the clean-up of terrorist camps. It will deepen bilateral defence cooperation. Although Bangladesh and India have held 11 military drills between 2009 and 2023, China’s entry has future implications. Could Bangladesh be drawn into some kind of cold war between India and China?
Substandard Chinese Defence Supplies
In 2022, the Bangladesh Army expressed dissatisfaction with military supplies from Beijing. There have been rejections of tank ammunition supply. Also, there have been issues about spare parts for tank repair and maintenance. The HQ-7 short-range SAMs supplied by China were found to have defects. The two Ming-type submarines procured at a discounted rate also failed to meet operational expectations.
Sonadia Island – Deep Sea Port
Sonadia Island is a small 9 square kilometres size, offshore of Cox’s Bazar coast in Chittagong Division, Bangladesh. It is 15 km north-west of Cox’s Bazar District Headquarters. China had been eyeing a naval base in BoB and had offered to initially develop the Sonadia Islands as a deep sea port for Bangladesh, which could have later turned out to be another Gwadar-type headache for Indian defence establishments. The island could have provided a new bead for the ‘string of pearls’ and could have affected India’s clear strategic advantage in the BoB. Luckily, in 2020, Bangladesh finally buried the project. It is hoped that the new government does not reopen the subject.
The Chinese government still wants to extend funds for the design, construction, and operation of the deep-sea port in Bangladesh on a build-own-operate-transfer basis. Chittagong or Sonadia could give China direct access to the BoB and, in extension, to the Indian Ocean.
Payra Port
Bangladesh’s third largest seaport, Payra port, now the deepest port in the country, was originally planned as China’s bid for another deep seaport in its String of Pearls strategy. The construction of the port, which was being financed on a public-private partnership (PPP) platform, was initially granted to a Chinese company. India, Japan, and the United States opposed the plan. The Payra Port Authority (PPA) then signed a deal with Belgium-based dredging company Jan De Nul (JDN) for capital and maintenance dredging of the 75-kilometre-long main channel of the under-construction Payra seaport. In March 2023, JDN completed capital dredging.
Adani Group Interest In Bangladesh Ports
Adani Group intends to venture into the port sector in Bangladesh through a private partnership. The company is deliberating to invest in Chittagong Port’s planned Bay Terminal, a deep terminal proposed to come up near the port. China and India are both vying to invest in the development and modernisation of Bangladesh’s Mongla port. Since 2017, Adani Power has supplied 1,496 MW of net capacity under a 25-year contract via a 400 kV dedicated transmission line connected to the Bangladesh grid from its Jharkhand plant.
China-Myanmar Dynamics
Generally, China has maintained positive relationships with both military and elected governments in Myanmar. Bilateral relations between China and Myanmar have faced difficulties due to alleged Chinese backing of rebels in Myanmar’s territories. Also due to ongoing clashes between ethnic Chinese rebels and the Myanmar military near the China-Myanmar border. Beijing’s recent warm-up with the Army Junta was driven by self-interest and reactionary hedging to America’s Burma Act.
China assisted in constructing a naval base in Sittwe, a strategically important sea port close to India’s Kolkata port. Beijing also funded road construction to Yangon and Sittwe, providing the shortest route to the Indian Ocean from southern China.
Earlier, Myanmar allowed China to establish monitoring and surveillance facilities at the Coco Islands, just 45 kilometres north of the Andaman Islands. It allows tracking India’s missile launches off the Balasore test range in Odisha as well as strategic assets stationed off the eastern seaboard at Visakhapatnam.
Bangladesh-China Closeness: Implications For India
India remains an important factor in the China-Bangladesh relationship. China acts as a counterbalance against large neighbour India. India is conscious that Bangladesh is strategically important for India’s connection with its northeast and for its look and act east policy. India had to increase its ties with Myanmar, which is a competitor of Bangladesh, in the wake of growing Sino-Bangladesh ties. But during Hasina’s years in power, Bangladesh had carefully balanced the two relationships.
The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC) have seen uninformed negative reactions in Bangladesh. This became a potential for friction. The other points of contention include long-standing bilateral river water disputes, significant trade imbalance in favour of India, and illegal entry of Bangladeshi citizens into Assam and West Bengal.
Complexity will increase if the military or BNP remain in power. Also, the Teesta water management project that involves building a reservoir in Bangladesh, if funded by China, will move Dhaka further closer to Beijing.
Bangladesh remains crucial to the emerging BoB geopolitics. Although the military assets provided by China to Bangladesh don’t present any military threat to India, increasing defence ties will put pressure on India’s Indo-Pacific strategy. If Bangladesh remains unfriendly to India, Pakistan could also take advantage, including in connivance with China.
Way Ahead India
China’s South Asian policy has strategic designs that may harm India’s interests in the region. By positioning itself as a protector of Bangladeshi sovereignty, China aims to mitigate American influence, thereby creating indispensability. As China inches closer to Bangladesh and its military, it becomes a reason for India’s concerns.
The timing of China’s support, amidst Bangladesh’s election cycle and tiffs with the US, is a deliberate strategy with its own dynamics. It is best for India to let post-Hasina chaos settle down. Continue its generous approach. Find better consultative ways for development assistance and infrastructure building. Also, the continued presence of Hasina in India could remain an irritant. Her early move to an acceptable country must be hastened.
Bangladesh was born with India’s support but gradually leaned towards aggressive and expansionist China. A hostile Bangladesh is bad for India in view of the narrow Siliguri corridor between China and Bangladesh that connects India’s North East.Yet, Bangladesh and India have signalled concerns over Chinese plans to dam and divert water from the Brahmaputra River in Tibet.
The huge trade deficit with China is also a concern for Bangladesh, as it can possibly push Bangladesh into a debt trap. At one stage, China was also keen to build Bangladesh’s nuclear plants. Finally, the contract for the Rooppur nuclear power plant was given to the Russian Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation.
China’s long-term plan is to cultivate South Asian countries through arms deals and deceptive trade models, which will entangle them in debt traps and misunderstandings. India must keep cautioning Bangladesh. India must continue military engagement by offering more training courses. India’s $500 million credit line to Bangladesh has been operational since 2022. India can offer maintenance contracts for Russian-origin equipment such as Mi-17-1V helicopters, Antonov An-32 aircraft, and MiG 29 jets, which India uses. India is also now in a position to offer defence equipment, including all-terrain special-purpose vehicles, helicopters, BrahMos missiles, radars, arms, and ammunition, at competitive rates.
Efforts must be continued to improve regional connectivity projects and the integration of Bangladesh’s economy and its military strategy into India’s Bharat Mala and Sagar Mala projects. The two must work on the Look East Act East projects more vigorously under the broad contours of IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) and BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation). India must exploit the shift in Myanmar’s foreign policy to avoid excessive dependence on China. India must also keep good relations with Thailand, the other player in the BoB.
Hasina’s Bangladesh had been engaging with China, keeping Indian sensibilities in mind. The same may not happen in the immediate future. India has a Maldives-like situation to handle with maturity. India must remember that Bangladesh needs India no less than the other way around. Strategically, BoB is important for India’s second strike capability. India has to keep it secured and dominate it.
By wanting to set up a military base in Bangladesh, the US is perhaps trying to reduce/neutralise Chinese influence. But it is not in India’s interest that the US comes in here. They already have bases in Diego Garcia and have access to Australia’s Cocos Keeling Island base. The US’ global interests keep changing. As a Quad member, it is best if it trusts India to dominate the BoB.
It is time for Indian security analysts to stop painting “doomsday scenarios” in their writings and on TV debates. There are geostrategic ups and downs, but the world carries on and adjusts to changes. Bangladesh would also have to be part of global realpolitik.
The writer is former Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies
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