After a series of major maritime standoffs, the Philippines is in hot pursuit of more India-made BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to point at China in the contested South China Sea.

The Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) plans to bolster its coastal defenses with two additional batteries of the shore-based supersonic anti-ship missile by 2026, WION reported this month.

The PMC is already set to receive three BrahMos batteries, each comprising four launchers with three missiles capable of striking targets up to 290 kilometers away. The acquisition, the WION report notes, significantly enhances the Philippines’ ability to deter and counter maritime threats.

WION says the Philippines’ potential additional purchase would boost India’s defense exports and underscore the BrahMos missile’s marketability amid a gathering East Asian arms race.

The report adds that the Philippine Army (PA) might also consider procuring the missiles, potentially arming the Philippines for land and naval strikes.

WION touts the BrahMos missile’s high speed and long range, making it a formidable weapon against maritime threats and thus strengthening the Philippines’ coastal defense capabilities.

The report notes that the deepening defense relationship between the Philippines and India has occurred amid Manila’s clashes with China in the South China Sea and Delhi’s with China in the Himalayas.

It says delivering BrahMos missiles is crucial for the Philippines to counter China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea, providing a credible deterrent and defense capability to assert sovereignty and rights in the West Philippine Sea.

WION points out that India’s decision to export the BrahMos missile to the Philippines signifies a strategic shift, extending its influence beyond the Indian Ocean to the Indo-Pacific region amid hot and cold relations with China.

Previously, Asia Times reported in June 2024 that the Philippines is bolstering its defense posture in the South China Sea by constructing a base for its newly acquired BrahMos missiles, which India supplied in a historic US$375 million deal.

Situated at the Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui in Zambales, Western Luzon, the base overlooks the disputed waters and is poised to house BrahMos missile batteries capable of striking the China-occupied, Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal.

Still, the Philippines faces significant challenges even with US mutual defense guarantees. For one, Manila lacks long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and over-the-horizon (OTH) radar.

Second, it relies on a small fleet of vulnerable drones and aircraft for ISR tasks, potentially capping the range of its BrahMos missiles to just a few dozen kilometers in a China conflict scenario.

Further, the Philippines’ lack of air defense assets may force it to choose between defending military installations such as its BrahMos missile base or critical infrastructure and population areas.

Logistical hurdles such as the Philippines’ vulnerability to naval blockade, inability to domestically manufacture BrahMos missiles to sustain its stockpiles and China’s gray zone warfare tactics could further undermine the deterrent impact of its BrahMos missiles.

Manila’s expectations of the US, with which it shares a mutual defense treaty, in a potential China conflict at sea are unclear.

But the US’ muted response to the Philippines’ June 2024 maritime standoff with China may belie a foregone conclusion that Washington will not risk a major confrontation with Beijing over disputed features claimed by the Philippines in the South China Sea.

Asia Times noted in June 2024 that the incident wasn’t the first time the US sold out the Philippines to China, as shown by its lack of assistance in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff and its refusal in 2016 to enforce with military might the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) ruling against China in favor of the Philippines over their disputed South China Sea claims.

However, additional BrahMos missiles can address one of the Philippines’ critical vulnerabilities as a US ally in a potential Taiwan conflict—being in the range of a substantial portion of China’s power projection and strike capabilities from occupied sea features such as Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef.

BrahMos target: the China-occupied Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea

An interactive map made by the Centre of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) shows that Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef can house cruise missiles, bombers and fighter aircraft whose ranges cover the entire Philippines and South China Sea.

Such a vulnerability could be a significant reason why the US has opted not to push to re-establish permanent military bases in the Philippines after closing them in 1991, even if it is capable of brushing off and tacitly bribing away the Philippines’ sovereignty concerns of hosting foreign troops.

The US currently rotates troops and equipment through the Philippines as per their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which has opened more Philippines bases to the US Pentagon under Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

Underscoring that vulnerability, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported this month that China has been practicing strikes on US F-22 and F-35 mockups in the Taklamakan Desert, ostensibly rehearsing how to destroy those fighters on the ground in a preemptive strike.

In the event of a possible Taiwan conflict, US forces stationed in the Philippines under EDCA could quickly be in China’s line of fire, with US and Philippine aircraft destroyed on the ground in a possible surprise attack against EDCA sites such as Antonio Bautista Air Base in Palawan, Basa Air Base in Pampanga and Benito Ebuen Air Base in Cebu.

However, additional BrahMos missile sites in Palawan could conceivably target Chinese military installations and aircraft parked on Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef, holding those at risk and forestalling the threat of a preemptive strike on US forces in the Philippines.

If the Philippines chooses to acquire more BrahMos missiles, it can signal to the US and allied defense planners that it is not as helpless as it now seems against China’s preponderance of military force.

Such an acquisition would show that the Philippines is a defensible forward operating base and that the US and its allies may be justified in investing in a more extensive military presence on its territories.

Providing targeting data to the Philippines’ BrahMos batteries may also be a viable way for the US to toughen up Manila’s defenses while avoiding confrontation with China. But perhaps no number of BrahMos missiles can help the Philippines in dealing with China’s ramped-up gray zone tactics.

SCMP reports that China has started using more aggressive “darker gray” tactics against the Philippines, including actions that have seen its maritime militia and law enforcement vessels ram, board and impede resupply missions to the latter’s occupied features in the region.

These actions, SCMP notes, remain below the threshold of armed conflict while forcing the Philippines into a tight spot between de-escalation and making a mistake that China could use as a justification for further use of force, possibly resulting in more territorial losses for the Philippines.

(With Inputs From International Agencies)