One Year Later, No Sign of India’s ‘Affordable’ Weapons In Africa
Akash (In Pic) is a surface-to-air missile developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation. The Akash missiles were inducted by the Indian Air Force in July 2015. Akash missiles can destroy aircraft within the range of 30km to 35km and at altitudes up to 18,000m. A successful flight test of the AKASH-NG missile was conducted in January 2024
It is exactly one year and a few months since India’s defence companies proposed selling ‘affordable’ weapons to African militaries to help fight terrorists. In April last year, various defence companies from India showcased domestically-made helicopters, drones, and artillery at a gathering of army chiefs and officials from 31 African nations, as New Delhi, one of the world’s largest arms importers seeks to become a major exporter too.
India’s Defence Industry
India has been working diligently to increase its presence in the arms trade and compete with powerhouse nations like Russia and China. This ambition has seen India focus its efforts on selling its domestically produced weapons to African militaries, which are often unable to afford Western-made equipment. India has already had some success in this sector and is now looking to build upon this as it hopes to become a major player in African arms deals.
India has developed and manufactured a vast array of advanced and highly reliable weapons and defence systems, ranging from small arms to sophisticated aircraft. These are made available to African militaries at a fraction of the cost of their Western counterparts, making them an attractive option for poorer nations. India has also made great strides in providing maintenance and support for its weapons systems, making them a reliable and cost-effective option for African militaries.
India is hoping to capitalize on its growing presence in Africa to not only sell more of its domestically produced hardware but also to gain access to new markets and further strengthen its global presence. India has already made strong inroads into the African arms market and is confident that, with the right strategies in place, it can become a major player in the sector and compete with Russia and China for arms deals.
Despite the media frenzies at the time, however, there has been little to no progress regarding the venture. Well, to be fair, there has been ‘some’ progress in that regard.
A few months after the promise of ‘affordable’ weapons, Nigeria signed a $1 billion deal with India to boost its defence it’s industry. The deal, which was signed with the Managing Arm of the Military-Industrial Complex of the Indian government, will see the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) become 40% self-sufficient in local manufacturing and production of defence equipment by 2027.
The new deal will provide DICON with the funding and expertise it needs to modernize its facilities and produce a wider range of products. This includes everything from firearms and ammunition to armoured vehicles and advanced communication systems. It will also help to create jobs and boost the Nigerian economy. For Nigeria, the deal is a good move because it bore fruit immediately, as state-owned DICON resumed the production of arms and ammunition after years of suspension.
One Year On, No Weapon Sale
Besides that, there have been no actual weapons sales from India to any African recipient. Although, Botswana started talks with India’s state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to acquire at least a squadron of its Tejas fighter planes, to enhance its defence capabilities. However, the deal failed to materialize.
Likewise, Egypt, one of India’s strategic partners in the Middle East, expressed interest in acquiring the Akash air defence missile system, a medium-range mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) system developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and produced by Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL). The Akash missile system can target aircraft up to 45 km (28 mi) away and can neutralise aerial targets like fighter jets, cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and ballistic missiles. It is in operational service with the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force.
This deal too appears to have fallen through even though Egypt had hoped to replace the IRIS-T SLM air defence system it paid to Germany, but was given to Ukraine in August. Egypt and India already have an existing robust defence cooperation, particularly in the area of military sales, training, and technical transfer of knowledge. The two countries have also been conducting joint exercises and port visits by their naval and air forces.
It is not yet certain why the Egyptian Akash deal and Botswana TEJAS fell through, however, experts believe it may be connected to Indians’ complex bureaucratic process in developing, fielding, and supplying weapons.
The TEJAS Debacle
India even tried to sell its TEJAS fighter jets to Nigeria after signing the $1 billion defence industry bill, similarly, Nigeria rejected the aircraft. Nigeria is one of the largest and most populous countries in Africa, with a GDP of $477 billion and a population of 214 million. It is also one of the most troubled countries in the continent, facing security threats from various sources, such as the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram, separatist movements, communal violence, and piracy.
Nigeria’s air force, which has a strength of about 15,000 personnel and 150 aircraft, is in dire need of modernization and expansion. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nigeria’s air force inventory consists of mostly obsolete or ageing platforms, such as the Alpha Jet, the F-7, and several helicopters. Nigeria also operates only three JF-17 Thunders, a fighter jet developed by China, which it acquired in 2018.
Nigeria’s interest in the TEJAS stems from its long-standing military and diplomatic relations with India, which date back to the 1960s. India helped Nigeria establish its defence academy and naval college, and the two countries have cooperated in joint military training, exchange programmes, and UN peacekeeping operations.
Despite the close ties between India and Nigeria, the sale of the TEJAS fighter jet to Nigeria is highly unlikely, for several reasons. First, the TEJAS are still unproven in combat and have not been fully operationalized by the Indian Air Force. The TEJAS has faced several delays and technical issues in its development and has not yet achieved the final operational clearance (FOC) that certifies its readiness for combat. The TEJAS is also yet to be equipped with some of the advanced weapons and systems that it is supposed to carry, such as the beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) and the active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.
The TEJAS has been offered to Botswana and Egypt but both countries rejected it, despite HAL offering to set up production facilities in Egypt for the TEJAS MK-1A. Egypt instead chose the KAI FA-50/T-50 Golden Eagle jet, while Botswana likely opted for the SAAB JAS-39 Gripen. HAL chairman CB Ananthakrishnan said regarding the business that the discussions with the potential buyers are progressing and that the company is opening offices in some overseas markets to facilitate the exports.
Aritra Banerjee, military author, and journalist covering Defence & Aerospace agrees that India’s defence procurement process does face bureaucratic hurdles, which can lead to delays.
However, he opines that “the complexities of international arms trade involve multiple factors beyond bureaucracy, such as extensive negotiations, regulatory approvals, customisation of equipment, and establishing reliable after-sales support.”
“Despite these obstacles, India remains committed to delivering on its promises. For instance, the significant deal with Nigeria demonstrates India’s effectiveness in this market. Additionally, India’s ongoing efforts to streamline its defence procurement process, including reforms within the DRDO and enhancing collaboration with the private sector, are aimed at reducing delays and improving efficiency.” He says.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has set a target of $25 billion in defence exports by 2025, up from $8.6 billion in 2020. India is also looking to expand its strategic and military ties with African countries, where it faces rivalry from China and Russia. The country aims to more than double its annual arms exports to $5 billion in the coming years from about $1.7 billion currently.
How achievable is this goal is a big question. In August 2021, the Wire, an Indian publication reported In a scathing indictment of India’s defence acquisition procedures, that the Indian Army’s chief of staff General M M Naravane dubbed them ‘overbearing’ and archaic, holding them responsible for collectively delaying materiel acquisitions and pausing military modernisation. Speaking at a webinar on ‘Transformation imperatives for the Indian Army in the coming decades’ organised by the United Services Institution (USI) in New Delhi on August 3, the Indian Army chief said that the country’s materiel acquisition procedures were hostage to the ‘zero error syndrome”.
For General Naravane, this embodied a complex and bureaucratic web of procurement regulations that interminably delayed materiel purchases as the concerned officials were ultra-cautious in vindicating their acquisition tasks. Coming from the army chief, such criticism is, at the very least, surprising and, at its worst, gratuitous as he occupies a position that wields considerable influence over the formulation of the MoD’s procurement procedures and policies.
Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership, the Indian government introduced ambitious and comprehensive proposals for military modernization. In 2021, India’s Defence Minister, Rajnath Singh, released a booklet outlining 20 reforms aimed at positioning India as a military-industrial powerhouse. Modi’s administration has prioritized strengthening India’s military-industrial complex, driven by his vision of India not only as a regional force but also as an ascending global power. Modi came to power with a promise to reform India’s defence organizations and ecosystem.
India has consistently held the title of the world’s largest arms importer over the past decade. Annually, it allocates between $3 billion to $5 billion for purchasing military equipment from Russia and other sources. However, its own arms exports remain relatively modest, ranging from $40 million to $60 million per year. India’s reliance on foreign arms traces back to its independence in 1947. During this period, the country procured more than half of its defence equipment from its former colonial ruler, Britain, until around 1961. As military aid from the U.K. and the U.S. waned, India turned to the Soviet Union and later Russia, which has been the primary supplier of India’s arms for over five decades.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi aims to transform India into a major weapons exporter by attracting foreign investment and expertise. However, India faces challenges due to its cumbersome bureaucracy and complex procurement process. Despite having the world’s fifth-largest defence budget, India still imports 60% of its arms. The Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) works on indigenous products, but frequent delays often result in outdated equipment upon production.
An illustrative case is the Akash surface-to-air missile defence system. The DRDO spent nearly three decades developing these missiles, only to find that they lacked the latest tracking technology. Consequently, India’s army decided not to order additional Akash missiles in 2016, leaving Prime Minister Modi disappointed with the DRDO’s performance.”
“India will not just manufacture for import substitution, but will also boost defence production to export Indian-made defence products to countries around the world,” Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said on April 11, 2018, at DefExpo, a biennial defence exhibition that opened in the city of Chennai on the same day.
But she later expressed doubts about pushing homemade equipment. “I can’t for a moment imagine that I will prevail upon them that they necessarily buy what is Indian,” she said. Modi’s arms export ambitions depend on unblocking policy bottlenecks. Slow decision-making and production inhibit the defence sector’s embrace of ‘Make in India’, as well as lack of adequate funding.
The Defence Ministry’s research and development budget stayed mostly flat in fiscal 2015 and fiscal 2016. In 2015, Modi made reforming higher defence management, promoting jointness, transforming defence manufacturing, and overhauling defence procurement policies part of his government’s vision and priorities. Some declassified reports of early 2020 reveal that the government has implemented only 99 of 188 recommendations of a Committee of Experts (Shekatkar Committee) that set “the guiding principle for ongoing defence reforms.”
Nevertheless, the proposed reforms lack concrete financial commitments for implementation. The allocation and utilization of the defence budget have continued to follow erratic patterns since India’s independence. These include uneven spending, prolonged political approvals, high rates of underutilization, and a lack of rigorous analysis regarding the objectives of the allocated defence funds. Notably, India’s defence budget allocation remains significantly below the recommended 2.5 to 3 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Despite the country’s needs, India’s defence spending as a percentage of GDP has declined and currently stands at 1.90 percent in the financial year 2024-25, the lowest in the past decade. The defence budget has suffered from inconsistent allocation due to inadequate political oversight, with annual growth rates fluctuating between as high as 43 percent and as low as zero percent. Notably, a significant portion of the defence budget is directed toward revenue expenditure rather than the much-needed modernization (capital expenditure) of the armed forces. Consequently, many modernization initiatives face either underfunding or mismanagement.”
Even though, Aritra Banerjee believes that “India is well-placed to deliver affordable weapons to African nations, leveraging its growing defence manufacturing capabilities. The £1 billion deal with Nigeria is a testament to India’s expertise and reliability in the defence sector. Initiatives like ‘Make in India’ are enhancing self-reliance, boosting capacity to produce and export high-quality defence equipment.”
“Recently, India achieved a significant milestone by becoming an exporter of sniper rifles for the first time, with SSS Defence, a Bengaluru-based firm, securing a contract to supply .338 Lapua Magnum calibre sniper rifles to a friendly nation. Furthermore, India’s defence diplomacy has been strengthened by joint exercises with African countries, such as the India-Africa Field Training Exercise (IAFTX), showcasing India’s capability to meet specific requirements and deliver high-quality weapons, making it an attractive partner for African militaries.” He concluded.
Despite recent efforts, India remains the world’s largest arms importer. The country needs to strengthen its indigenous production capabilities to reduce this dependence. The defence sector requires continuous innovation and technological advancements. Enhancing R&D capabilities is crucial for developing cutting-edge weapons systems and technologies. India must invest in acquiring and developing advanced technologies to stay competitive globally. Bridging this technology gap is essential for achieving self-reliance.
Also, and most importantly, coordination between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Industrial Promotion needs improvement. Streamlining processes and clarifying roles can enhance efficiency. Closer collaboration between research organizations, production agencies (both public and private), and end-users is necessary for successful defence modernization. Efforts like the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative, reforms in defence procurement, and investments by private players are steps in the right direction. However, addressing these challenges remains critical for India’s defence industry growth.
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