by Chirayu Thakkar

The pomp of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to the US last June was matched by substance in the form of two major defence deals: the manufacturing of General Electric F-414 jet engines in India through technology transfer and the acquisition of General Atomics MQ-9B drones. However, those were announcements of intent. Before Hindustan Aeronautics can start manufacturing GE engines for the indigenous MK-2 light combat aircraft or the tri-services can induct MQ-9B drones, both these deals must go through customary rites of passage across bureaucratic and political institutions on both sides. They involve delicate and comprehensive negotiations, encompassing aspects ranging from price to licensing and training to warranties.

It is in this rigmarole that a deal can get ensnared into politics. Turkey’s long road to buying F-16s, even before it blocked Sweden’s NATO accession, is but one example. With the US Congressional approval for the drone deal earlier this month, a significant roadblock is out of the way. Nonetheless, many milestones remain to be crossed before the deal reaches the finish line.

For one, India will plunge into electioneering in a couple of months. Occupied with hustings, the political executive’s attention will be tenuous at best. Further, although defence procurements are theoretically exempt from the model code of conduct, the Election Commission of India takes a dim view of major decisions. By the time a new government is in place in New Delhi, a similar cycle will be unfolding in the US. Hence, without timely attention from both sides, this deal is seriously likely to be pushed into 2025.

Given the beleaguered eastern frontier, the strategic urgency of these drones can hardly be overstated. But there’s also a political opportunity for the Modi government in the timely closure of the drone deal. By letting the Biden administration score a brownie point with Indian-origin voters and leveraging the deal to mollify detractors within the Democratic Party—who are unhappy over a range of issues, from the alleged Gurpatwant Singh Pannun assassination plot to India’s defence ties with Russia—the Modi government can enter into a mature dialogue with the Democrats for long-term interests.

US Elections And Indian Deals

Undoubtedly, US elections are fought primarily on local issues. Nonetheless, an active diaspora can drag the incumbent administration’s ties with their nation of origin into American elections. One may dismiss defence issues as too esoteric for electoral choices. However, signature initiatives do carry a political message and are, therefore, prominently paraded. Candidates in the US understand this political significance and exploit every decision to their advantage.

The India-US nuclear deal is a case in point. Initially signed in 2005 during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to the US, the deal received the Congressional nod only in October 2008, a few weeks before the US national election. Senator John McCain, the Republican candidate for the presidency, was quick to give credit to the Republican administration while highlighting actions by his Democratic opponents, Barack Obama and his running mate Joe Biden, that could have scuttled the deal. The McCain campaign did not expect Indian-American voters to understand the strategic aspects of the nuclear deal. However, it was a political statement exuding support for India.

Indian-Americans, comprising roughly 1 per cent of US voters, have historically strong ties to the Democratic party. However, that allegiance is gradually weakening. Recent events—multiple attacks on Hindu mandirs, assaults on Indian-origin students, Khalistan separatism, and arson at Indian missions—have cast a shadow over the bond, particularly among naturalised Indian-born Hindus. According to a Carnegie Endowment report, the Indian-American population in key swing states was larger than the victory margin in the 2016 elections. Hence, neither Biden nor Trump (assuming he wins the nomination) can write them off. Although the drone deal was originally sanctioned by the Trump administration, President Biden can claim credit for it and reinforce to Indian-Americans that his administration remains invested in India’s defence and can work with the Modi government despite ideological differences.

Dialogue With Congressional Democrats

India has been a rare bipartisan success story in the US. Nevertheless, the Modi government has an uneasy relationship with Congressional Democrats. They have consistently criticised the Indian government on issues such as the crackdown in Kashmir, the treatment of minorities, purchase of Russian oil, and most recently, the alleged plot to assassinate Sikh separatist and US citizen Pannun. These cracks have manifested publicly on numerous occasions, including when Foreign Minister S Jaishankar cancelled a meeting on Capitol Hill due to Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal’s criticism of the Indian government’s handling of Kashmir after the abrogation of Article 370. Indian-origin members of Congress in both chambers are increasingly seen as vital links in US-India ties. Hence, in a rare measure, when an Indian, Nikhil Gupta, was indicted in the Pannun case, the Biden White House gave a classified briefing to five members of the US Congress. For the Modi government, which is eyeing a third term, not engaging with its critics within the Democratic Party is not an option.

A timely closure of the drone deal on India’s part can establish a positive and propitious narrative that the Modi government can effectively work with Democrats across the White House and Senate. This would also prevent the constituency critical of India’s Russia ties, especially the purchase of oil and S-400 missile defence systems, from further gravitating towards unwarranted portrayals of Russia as India’s “number one friend”. Along with the Biden administration, letting this caucus claim victory for the deal and highlight its potential for creating long-term jobs in the US for their own electoral benefit can moderate their odium.

To be sure, India’s diplomatic managers will not be able to placate every Democrat, especially those at the fag end of the progressive corner. The situation is somewhat similar to Congressional support to the Netanyahu government in Israel, which is mostly on a partisan basis. Nevertheless, the Israelis never fail to engage, even with progressive critics like Bernie Sanders. The happy ending of this deal should be just another occasion to engage for the future.

Strategic benefits aside, there is a political logic to this drone deal. It remains to be seen if both sides shrewdly exploit it or let it languish in a pit of red tape for months to come.

Chirayu Thakkar is a doctoral candidate jointly with the National University of Singapore and King’s College London