by Girish Linganna

On February 1, Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman will be presenting not the final Union Budget, but an interim one, since the Lok Sabha elections in the country are scheduled to be held in April/ May this year. Sitharaman was unequivocal that there will be no ‘big announcements’ this time around, meaning that this year’s Budget will be passed only as an end to meet expenses until the financial year. The allocation for the defence sector in Budget 2024-’25 could take a hit because of the elections. This could impact India’s deterrence posture.

At the moment, India’s defence sector is at a crucial stage. With geopolitical tensions heating up across the world, India’s need for self-reliance in strategic technology is getting more intense. Besides, India’s military must be on high alert to deal with any exigencies, especially on its Pakistan and China borders.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 changed the planning and budgeting strategy for the Indian military, which was earlier for a short and sharp conflict. And the logistics design? Build up for a 10i (10 days’ intense) war scenario, onto a 40i scenario. But now, with an extended war scenario, as seen in Ukraine—and especially in the Israel-Hamas war, even 40i seems too insignificant.

Earlier tensions and border disputes with China and Pakistan that occasionally lead to armed clashes, there is an urgent need to prioritize India’s armed forces’ modernization and self-reliance in arms production—especially ‘Make in India’.

Earlier, before the Union Budget for Financial Year 2023-’24, the parliamentary standing committee on defence had recommended a benchmark percentage of the GDP for allocation to India’s defence sector. The last Budget envisaged a total capital outlay of Rs 4,503,097 crore. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) was allocated 13.18 % of the total budget, which was Rs 593,537.64 crore, representing an enhancement of Rs 68,371.49 crore over that of 2022-’23.

In the run-up to FY2024-2025, expectations within India’s Defence sector are somewhat muted, with only minor fund allocation adjustments anticipated. Existing procurement plans, with thumbs-up to key initiatives—such as the second indigenous aircraft carrier at a cost of around Rs 40,000 crore, and the procurement of 97 Tejas Mark-1A aircraft—are likely to continue.

India’s defence budget allocations, if one considers the past few years, have not been productive in ‘actual’ terms. Even though the Parliament Standing Committee for Defence has pleaded for a Defence Budget of 3 per cent of the GDP, slight—and insignificant—percentage increases that are made do not account for cost escalations. The global ‘benchmark’ for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP is roughly 3%.

Experts estimate only a 5%-7% increase in capital outlay, focused more on strengthening India’s defence capabilities, belying the allocation projections by the armed forces—including the associated segments, like the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Coast Guard and Border Roads Organisation (BRO).

However, most likely, paeans will be sung to Atmanirbharta and ‘Make in India’—a recent and increasingly common eulogy for local R&D, manufacturing capabilities, indigenization and innovation, besides declaring an embargo on imports to boost private sector participation. Notwithstanding that, India has plans to import weapons platforms and weapons, such as Rafales and more Scorpene submarines for the Navy; 73,000 SiG Sauer assault rifles from the US; Predator MQ-9B drones from the US and such others. The ‘Make in India’ slogan sounds fine, but self-sufficiency is way beyond for maybe decades. As things stand now, a mix of ‘Make in India’ and imported substitutes is crucial for India’s deterrence capability.

The next Defence Budget should do well to clearly spell out certain terms: The dangers from China and Pakistan are real and present and growing at both the intractable geopolitical level—the Maldives, Indian Ocean Region and South China Sea—and conventional level. China’s second highway through Aksai Chin is running perilously close to Galwan and Pangong Tso and one more expressway to Nepal for offensive purposes.

Technologically, with China more than a few decades away from India to catch up with—with the People’s Liberations Army’s (PLA’s) expertise with hypersonic missiles, UAVs and electromagnetic and space/near-space-based weapons.

In 2018, the Indian Army proclaimed that 68% of its war machinery was obsolete. Swarm drone combat capability is imperative for India, especially with focus on developing futuristic drones and e-warfare systems to be able to face up to future challenges. Future Infantry Combat Vehicles (FICVs) are an urgent necessity.

Mobility for infantry in plains needs examination. In a multi-polar global scenario, military strategies are increasingly influenced by a nation’s economic interests. Consequently, conflicts are anticipated to be more prevalent in the middle and lower segments of the spectrum, underscoring the crucial role of infantry in safeguarding a nation’s interests in the future. This transformation envisions specialized infantry units equipped with well-developed core competencies capable of addressing diverse segments of the threat spectrum.

This shift signifies a fundamental change from a threat-centric approach to a capability-based model within the armed forces. The emphasis on versatile and adaptable infantry units reflects the strategic imperative of aligning military capabilities with the evolving geopolitical landscape and the multifaceted nature of contemporary security challenges. (IPA Service)

Girish Linganna is a Defence & Aerospace analyst and is the Director of ADD Engineering Components (India) Pvt Ltd, a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany with manufacturing units in Russia. He is Consulting Editor Industry and Defence at Frontier India