by Krzysztof Iwanek

Decades after the little state of Junagadh eventually joined India, the Nawab’s family continues to live in Pakistan. In 2020, many would have not heard of the Junagadh dispute if not for the recent unveiling of Pak’s new ‘political map’.

In 2020, the Sindh High Court stayed its ruling according to which a particular historical building in Karachi could not be used for weddings and similar commercial functions. This little-noticed event has actually something to tell us – it shows the insignificance of a particular dispute between India and Pakistan.

That building is the Junagadh House – a residence once given to the Nawab of Junagadh when the ruler fled to Karachi after his abortive accession to Pakistan in 1947. Decades after the little state of Junagadh eventually joined India, the Nawab’s family continues to live in Pakistan. In 2020, many would have not heard of the Junagadh dispute if not for the recent unveiling of Pakistan’s new ‘political map’.

Just like in the case of Kashmir, the dispute over Junagadh has its roots in the events of 1947. When all rulers of princely states were being asked whether they preferred to accede to India and Pakistan, the Nawab of Junagadh, Mahabat Khan, was one of the few who refused to yield to pressure. On the eve of Pakistan and India’s independence, the monarch announced his decision to join the former country.

Governments of both Indian and Pakistani were at first probably puzzled by this move, as Junagadh, a little principality in Kathiawar, was completely surrounded by Indian territory. But what turned to be a crucial factor of the issue was its connection to the simultaneous Kashmir dispute.

As it is widely known, the maharaja of Kashmir abstained from acceding to any of the two countries by August 14/15, and even in the next weeks. While both republics continuously tried to woo him, Pakistan’s claim was largely based on the fact that the majority of his subjects were Muslims. Yet, in mid-September 1947 Pakistan announced that it accepted Junagadh’s accession. In Junagadh, the monarch and the ruling elite were Muslim but the population was mostly Hindu. The ruler of Junagadh had a right to accede to Pakistan but by accepting his decision, the latter country undermined its own principle of claiming its rights only to Muslim-majority territories.

The later events developed quickly – and these were covered in great detail in Shrinath Raghavan’s War and Peace in Modern India. Of Nawab’s three vassals, the lord of Bantva-Manavadar opted for Pakistan but masters of Mangrol and Babariawad announced accession to India (though the former backtracked promptly). Being their sovereign, Mohabat Khan did not accept the decision of the latter two and used force against them, to which India responded by sending its soldiers to defend the principalities. The situation was made worse by the adamant stance of Jinnah who repeatedly rejected New Delhi’s offers to solve the Junagadh crisis through a plebiscite.

While the threat of a clash between Junagadh and India’s units loomed large, on 22 October a much profound military conflict was ignited elsewhere, with Pakistan’s thinly-veiled invasion of Kashmir. While that conflict was only starting, Junagadh’s fate was sealed within the next weeks. The Nawab, faced with Indian soldiers standing nearly at his borders and the provisional government formed by the principality’s opposition closing in on him as well, fled to Pakistan. His Dewan, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, handed over the reins of administration to India in November 1947 (though it was Bhutto who first convinced the Nawab to accede to Pakistan). In February next year, a referendum in Junagadh was held in which the majority of population chose to join India – this plebiscite was never accepted by Pakistan, however.

The incoherence between Pakistan’s stand on Junagadh and its moves on Kashmir cancelled most of Karachi’s strongest points in its territorial disputes with New Delhi. Since Pakistan accepted the accession of Muslim-ruled, Hindu-majority Junagadh to itself, why could it not accept the accession of a Hindu-ruled, Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir to India, given that both were based on the monarchs’ decisions? Pakistan kept pointing out that the Indian government did not fulfil its promise of holding a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir, for its part Pakistan did not accept the results of a referendum in Junagadh.

After their flight to Pakistan, the once-wealthy family of the Nawab was promptly reduced to a status of royal exiles – enjoying the property granted by their new state but politically insignificant. The family of Junagadh’s Dewan, Shah Nawaz Bhutto (who also fled to Pakistan), fared much better, however. As the Bhuttos had held a lot of land in Sindh, Shah Nawaz Bhutto established one of the most powerful lineages in Pakistani politics: his son was none other but Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Later, in 1976, by history’s ironical gesture, the son of the Nawab of Junagadh, Muhammad Dilawar Khanji, was appointed as the Governor of Sindh by the son of the Dewan of Junagadh – Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

The Nawab’s grandson, who still uses the title, keeps bringing the issue of Junagadh. The royal family’s current position is perhaps best measured by the recent event mentioned at the beginning of this text – the fact that a court did not allow them to rent their residence for weddings.

Krzysztof Iwanek is the Head of the Asia Research Centre at War Studies University (Poland)