NEW DELHI: After Pakistan foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi publicly berated Saudi Arabia for failing to allow the OIC to stand with Pakistan against India on Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistan was compelled to prepay a $1 billion loan to Saudi Arabia a few days ago, part of a $3.2 billion loan given in 2018.

Eyebrows were raised at what many said was temerity displayed by the Pakistan foreign minister. In a TV show, Qureshi was quoted as saying, “I am once again respectfully telling OIC that a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers is our expectation. If you cannot convene it, then I’ll be compelled to ask Prime Minister Imran Khan to call a meeting of the Islamic countries that are ready to stand with us on the issue of Kashmir and support the oppressed Kashmiris.”

Given Pakistan’s close relations with Saudi Arabia, what was he thinking? More importantly, what was Saudi Arabia trying to convey to Pakistan? The August 5 Kashmir show by Pakistan obviously did not go down as expected, except for a lot of noise and a new political map claiming J&K and Junagadh. But it was the silence of the OIC that cut deep. For months, Pakistan has been trying to convene a meeting of OIC foreign ministers in Islamabad to condemn India’s actions. Saudi Arabia has reportedly stood in the way, only allowing an OIC contact group meeting. Pakistan has not received any comfort from the UAE either, who have followed Saudi Arabia on this.

Why did Qureshi stick his neck out? He was clearly articulating a Pakistani frustration on the lack of international support on Kashmir, so his remarks were probably addressing a domestic constituency. Second, he could have been put up to it by the controlling military establishment, who may have used him to rattle the cage to assess Saudi behaviour. Third, if the rumours swirling around Islamabad have any truth in them, he may be positioning himself as an Imran Khan alternative.

Sources both here and in Pakistan don’t believe Khan is in any danger. But Qureshi, who took a similarly petulant position during the Raymond Davis case in 2011 and had to quit the PPP, may have said too much. Certainly, he was upbraided by opposition leader Shahbaz Sharif, who tweeted his displeasure against the foreign minister’s statement, saying it “flies in the face of history and Pakistan’s trusted relationship with the Kingdom. The cavalier attitude by this government is undermining Pakistan’s core relations with friendly countries.”

Some Pakistan observers believe it won’t be long before Pakistan sends a high-level delegation to Riyadh to make amends. It would be damaging if Saudi Arabia were to decide to return Pakistani workers in the kingdom and replace them with say, Bangladeshi workers, as they had once threatened. Second, as many Pakistani analysts point out, Mohammed bin Salman is very different as a Pakistan’s position as the standard-bearer of the ummah is also coming into question. Hoping to challenge Saudi Arabia’s pre-eminent position in the Islamic world, Pakistan has flirted with the idea of creating an alternate Islamic club — with Turkey, Iran, Qatar and Malaysia. The idea did not go far — Riyadh squashed all such pretensions, and after Malaysian strongman, Mahathir Mohamed was ousted, the idea cooled off. Saudi Arabia also cooled off on its promise to build infrastructure in Gwadar — the US-China discord came in the way, leaving Pakistan the loser.

Two other factors have come into play — first, the growing ties between the Gulf Arab states and India, and second, China’s presence. India, Saudi Arabia and UAE enjoy close economic ties, but it is the growing security and defence relations that have brought these countries much closer.

Many in Pakistan believed China and its deep pockets would make up for Saudi belligerence. Pakistan took an additional loan from China to pay off Saudi Arabia. But there are limits to how much China would oppose Saudis. For one, as the US, Indian, Japanese and Australian markets suffer for China due to declining relations, the Middle Eastern/Gulf market is still China’s for the taking. Second, while China may have signed a 25-year strategic partnership agreement with Iran, it is also engaged in uranium exploration in Saudi Arabia — taken to conclusion, it could provide Saudi Arabia with an alternative to relying on Pakistan for a nuclear option. China is increasing its presence in the key oil and gas chokepoints in the Straits of Hormuz, massively investing in the reconstruction of Iraq as well as in Iran. China, therefore, would not be interested in making an enemy of Saudi Arabia the pre-eminent power in the Gulf, for Pakistan.

For Islamabad, these would be sobering realisation.