Sameer Lalwani, a senior fellow for Asia strategy and director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Centre, in a recent article titled ‘Revelations and Opportunities: What the United States Can Learn from the Sino-Indian Crisis’ have suggested that “American defence policymakers and analysts should lean into this opportunity to improve ties with India, but also draw important lessons from this still unfolding episode to inform future strategy"

NEW DELHI: US defence planners studying the recent Sino-Indian crisis must appreciate India’s decision to turn to traditional defence supplier Russia “revealing an enduring and critical dependence” argued a noted scholar on South Asian affairs from leading US think-tank Stimson Centre.

Sameer Lalwani, a senior fellow for Asia strategy and director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Centre, in a recent article titled ‘Revelations and Opportunities: What the United States Can Learn from the Sino-Indian Crisis’ have suggested that “American defence policymakers and analysts should lean into this opportunity to improve ties with India, but also draw important lessons from this still unfolding episode to inform future strategy.” The article was published earlier this month in US-based ‘The War on the Rocks’, (a platform for analysis, commentary, debate and multimedia content on foreign policy)

As part of his argument Lalwani has opined that one of the features of the Sino-Indian crisis U.S. defence planners “should appreciate is India’s turn to Russia for arms, revealing an enduring and critical dependence.” He pointed out, “Even if India tries to lean toward the United States to counterbalance China, it will not be interested in nor capable of downgrading its relationship with Russia, which presents the United States with a serious challenge.”

Referring to Defence Minister’s Moscow trip, Lalwani noted, “Washington should have noticed Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s rapidly organized trip to Moscow to confer with Russian defence officials amid the ongoing Sino-Indian crisis. Reports suggested he had gone with the purpose of assuring an emergency supply of spare parts and equipment (including bombs and missiles), procuring new MiG-29 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, and expediting transfers of S-400 anti-aircraft batteries, all of which could play a role in the current standoff or future standoffs with China…”

“Furthermore, several news accounts suggest India has turned to Russia as a potential crisis manager. After all, some Indian analysts credited Moscow with helping to defuse the Doklam crisis in 2017 by pressing Beijing to resolve the standoff and remaining steadfastly neutral, effectively tipping things slightly in India’s favour,” Lalwani wrote.

“India’s crisis outreach to Russia serves as a reminder of their robust relationship. Contrary to some claims, an analysis with other colleagues suggests India’s share of Russian systems has grown, not decreased, because of Indian Army acquisitions. While India’s naval and air forces are decreasing their quantitative reliance on Russian arms, their most advanced or offensive capabilities still originate from Russia. Much like the Egyptian military’s reliance on Soviet platforms almost 50 years after it expelled Soviet trainers and began inducting U.S. equipment financed with $70 billion of U.S. security assistance, India’s dependence on Russia is likely to endure for decades as some systems (e.g., fighter aircraft, tanks, and multiple rocket launchers) remain in India’s arsenal and new systems (e.g., frigates, air defences, and nuclear submarines) come online.”

This resilient and deepening relationship with Russia will pose challenges for the U.S.-Indian partnership, according to the author. “While the United States treats Russia as an equally revisionist threat to the global order as China, India sees Russia as a partner to ensure a multipolar balance of power, and a hedge against a potential Sino-Russian bloc. Tactically, the sales of advanced Russian equipment complicate if not “limit” certain levels of interoperability between the Indian and U.S. militaries, not simply precluding procurement of advanced capabilities like the F-35, but also obstructing tactical communication and information systems interoperability due to potential security risks.”

“India’s relationship with Russia also complicates its otherwise bipartisan U.S. congressional support, and has generated recurring threats of punishment from the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, even if that support is not going away anytime soon. If U.S. defence planners want to leverage greater Indian military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, they will have to start wrestling with the trade-offs of an aggressive Russia containment policy and develop some “second-best” frameworks for both policies,” advised Lalwani.

Russian equipment certainly challenges U.S. interoperability with Indian forces, but Washington could develop second-best solutions, argued Lalwani. “Though a common operating picture often relies on securely linked equipment and communications, the problem is not insurmountable. Technical workarounds are feasible, and “targeted interoperability” efforts such as more frequent, high-intensity exercises on the most important joint contingencies (which India, of course, would have to be willing to pursue) could help improve the individual, command, and procedural aspects of jointly operating together."