A range of retaliation options across diplomacy, military and commerce are available to India. But it needs to shed the ‘fence-sitting’ foreign policy posture

by Indrani Bagchi

"Maarte maarte marey hain” If the night of June 15 taught this country anything, it is that this particular line should not have to be repeated. The brutal attack by Chinese troops on Indian forces in the Galwan Valley in Eastern Ladakh has alienated at least a couple of generations of Indians. It has put enormous pressure on the Modi government that is already battling a Chinese-origin coronavirus pandemic and a slowing economy.

But, first, India has to fix the problem on the boundary where Chinese troops have ingressed in several points in Ladakh and Sikkim. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement to other political parties on Friday evening was confusing enough for the Chinese to tweet that the Indian prime minister agreed with them. It took a clarification to set the record straight, which was necessary so it doesn’t undermine the negotiations India would have to enter into with China to bring peace to the boundary. Certainly with respect to Pangong Tso, where Chinese troops have hunkered down in a place called Foxhole Ridge, which is well within India’s claim line.

Yun Sun, China analyst at the Stimson Centre in Washington DC, writes in the strategic affairs platform War on The Rocks: “Historically, the Chinese consistently stick to the LAC of November 7, 1959, and the Indians stick to the LAC of September 8, 1962. China argues the territory between the two LACs was ‘unjustly occupied by India’ during those three years and was precisely the cause of the 1962 Sino-India War. To date, both sides insist they have been operating within their side of the LAC per these competing definitions.” She adds that China has no interest in settling its disputes with India “as it bogs India down as a continental power.”

So, no solution to the boundary issue is possible for the foreseeable future. The best we can hope for is to minimise face-offs and put in strict rules of engagement. The current rules were washed away in the Galwan river that night. India and China have an option — negotiate SOPs and boundary management protocols from scratch. Or, enter into a bloody conflict where no side actually wins. In addition, there are diplomatic, economic and strategic steps that can be taken, because China’s toxic aggression and an almost insatiable thirst for territory has to be contained.

All of these requires India to make fundamental changes to the way it functions and the way it deals with the world. The government has already put Chinese investments on a prior approval list, which came after it became clear that China was focusing inordinately on India’s tech and communications sectors. In the wake of the Galwan clash, several Chinese contracts have been cancelled. Even if some in the government believe otherwise, Huawei doesn’t have a future in India. This will have a ripple effect on other investments, both in the private and public sectors. But here’s the rub: while the security establishment might frown at the baggage that Chinese investments bring, the economic establishment is always happy about cheap money, and the government procurement system is geared to buying Chinese anyway due to the dictates of the “lowest bidder” system. Somehow, all these opposing forces need to be harmonised.

Removing Chinese apps from your phone is easy, decoupling from China without diversifying both supply chains and markets is much harder. Oddly enough, China’s refusal to allow India into its market may work in India’s favour, though how Indian industry will diversify from low-cost components and value-added materials from China remains to be seen. The recently -signed agreement with Australia on sourcing critical minerals from that country is a start.

India walked out of RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) in November, which, in hindsight, was a good move.

Ideally, India should be fast-tracking preferential trade deals with US, EU, UK — all natural partners — both in terms of sourcing technology and being valuable markets for India. This Rip Van Winkle has not yet woken, but should. That is priority. In the past couple of months, India has moved at admirable speed to equip itself to fight the pandemic and help other countries, too.

That spirit needs to spread out. As part of this change, the MEA should consider creating a body like the United States Trade Representative, to marry foreign and trade policies. That would be a real change, particularly if staffed with experts from different sectors.

That would give MEA greater ability to create space for the domestic industry. With India in the UN Security Council for the next couple of years, New Delhi can use its diplomatic skills to play a negative role where China is concerned.

China desperately wants to head key UN bodies. India has enough opportunities to play spoiler. Much more important and in need of change is India’s famed fence-sitting foreign policy posture. We have been steadily moving away from the “strategic autonomy” comfort zone, but still not comfortable with making too many overt choices. It’s changing, and should speed up.

Frankly, we need more eyes and ears on the ground so this business of Chinese intrusions every summer can be reduced.

The intelligence establishment had flagged Chinese movement back in March. We can do better in terms of coordinating and analysing intelligence, put in place rapid response teams to mark our turf and turf out the Chinese. The Galwan clash showed that it is not always a fighter aircraft that’s important.

Better gear for our soldiers, non-lethal weapons, weather-proof outfits (most of our men died of hypothermia), drones to see beyond visual distance should all be provided. We also need better tactical planning. We got beaten that night. But we must move on.