Whenever a Sino-Indian boundary crisis erupts, there is criticism that Indian policymakers are naïve about the China challenge. But, as Desai’s assertion, and those of leaders before and after him, makes evident, the problem has not been that Indian policymakers don’t recognise that China is a challenge. Instead, the problem has often been that leaders think they have time to tackle it

by Tanvi Madan

In 1967, as Chinese and Indian troops skirmished in Sikkim, Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai was asked on American TV about Beijing’s behaviour. He said, “They are mainly angry… that we are not submitting to their pressures and their bullying… They would like us to fall in line with their strategy… of dominating Asia and, ultimately, the world, as I see it.”

Whenever a Sino-Indian boundary crisis erupts, there is criticism that Indian policymakers are naïve about the China challenge. But, as Desai’s assertion — and those of leaders before and after him — makes evident, the problem has not been that Indian policymakers don’t recognise that China is a challenge. Instead, the problem has often been that leaders think they have time to tackle it. Yet, as crises like the current one have made evident, time is of the essence. Previous crises have led to calls for reckonings and rethinking; so will this one. But rethink what? Time, trade-offs and trust.

For one, there needs to be a sense of urgency and a focused effort to build domestic capabilities and capacities, including economic, military, intelligence, and coordination ones. The first is particularly crucial because economic power is what will provide the resources to back-up India’s rhetoric, underwrite its resolve, impose costs on its adversaries, and give India more space and options not just vis-a-vis China but also its partners.

Relatedly, this government has to ask, as previous governments have after such crises, what will most speedily and effectively allow India to achieve this economic objective. Self-reliance might be ideal. But, as Sardar Patel noted, it cannot be prioritised over security and development. India could learn something from China in the 1980s and 1990s, ie how to use global exposure to build domestic strength. Indeed, it could recall its own experience — post-liberalisation, India has not just taken more Indians out of poverty and created more jobs, but also had more resources to build its strategic infrastructure and capabilities, and had more countries seeking its partnership. Interdependence, managed well, can indeed help decrease Indian dependence over time.

If India can expand its economic pie, that will ease its guns versus butter trade-off. Nonetheless, that will also need to be rethought — as it was, for example, after 1962. An India that thinks it has time can postpone resourcing and reforming its military; an India that understands it does not, will have to make some choices.

These choices will need to include prioritising India’s challenges. Going back to Jawaharlal Nehru, a focus on Pakistan has affected the resources available and the thinking vis-à-vis China. Today, the China-Pakistan challenge is far more interlinked, but nonetheless, governments cannot lose sight of which country poses the primary challenge — even if China does not resonate in domestic politics in a way that Pakistan does.

The China challenge will also need a rethinking of the autonomy-alignment trade-off. Can partners constrain India? Perhaps, but they can also enable it. Managed well, alignment can indeed help strengthen Indian autonomy. Indian governments have worked to build a network of partnerships, recognising it can help India not just balance China, but also build capabilities. Yet, they too have often either let China or the pursuit of strategic autonomy set the bounds of these partnerships. Strategic autonomy is best thought of as a means to an end or an end that is subordinate to security and prosperity.

With regard to its partners, Delhi will have to do some rethinking. For instance, how best to make use of its partnership with the US even if it does not entirely trust Washington’s consistency or reliability. Or, given that a Sino-Russian split is not imminent, what a neutral or China-friendly Russia might mean for India. These are questions past Indian policymakers have asked themselves; they should consider them again.

India will also need to reconsider how it positions itself vis-à-vis China-US competition. It will entail different choices than US-Soviet competition offered. As even Nehru said, “There is no nonalignment vis-à-vis China.”

Nonetheless, it will neither be desirable nor feasible for India to stop engaging with China. But Delhi needs to be clear-eyed about what engagement will achieve and what it will not. Going into a relationship expecting you will change the other person is setting yourself up for disappointment. To paraphrase the poet Maya Angelou, when someone shows you who they are, believe them. This will require a better understanding of who China is — neither a 10-foot-tall, 6-dimensional chess player nor a challenge that can be underestimated. And it will require an approach that involves verifying, and only then maybe trusting.

As former defence minister George Fernandes noted, some of the choices outlined here will not only have to be considered by the government but also by the people. Indians might very well decide that these trade-offs are not worth it. But then, when the next crisis comes knocking, they should not be surprised.

Tanvi Madan is senior fellow at Brookings Institution and author of Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations During the Cold War