If there is one war that needs to be judged at this time, it is the India-China war of 1962

by Col (Dr) Divakaran Padma Kumar Pillay

Any war deserves to be judged twice. First for the reasons that led to the fighting and second, for the outcome of the conflict and its impact on the history of the nations involved. If there is one war that needs to be judged at this moment in time, it is the India-China war of 1962.

After the war ended, popular narrative held that India, humiliated by the defeat of 1962, was incapable of taking on larger, and more aggressive China. India, then led by Prime Minister Nehru, seemed to have given in to placate the Chinese on every front — ranging from minor concessions to major territorial rights.

Events Leading To 1962

In 1952 Nehru had agreed to downgrade India’s representation in Tibet to consul-general. Two years later he agreed to withdraw the Indian Military posts. (It was during this hasty withdrawal that Maj BS Nagal, the Second in Command of 2nd Battalion of the Jat Regiment, and about eighty other army men lost their lives in a flash flood caused by the collapse of an earthen dam on 17 July 1954**).

This was followed by the recall, for the first time since Younghusband’s expedition, of trade representative at Kashgar, Gartok, Yatung and Gyantse. With this, India cut all links to Tibet—effectively severing their connections with the outside world implicitly conceding that Tibet’s foreign relations were to be controlled by China. The acquiescence to non-interference in China's actions was later formalised under the Panchsheel Agreement at the Bandung Conference in 1954.

On the request of the Chinese, rations were provided for support of soldiers occupying Tibet in 1950 through Nathu-La. Then there was also the facilitation of a journey to Lhasa of the Chinese Governor of Tibet, General Chang Chin-wu, via Calcutta and Sikkim. There was also a weak justification behind the Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin through which China completed a 1,200-kilometre road connecting Gartok in Western Tibet with Yeh (Yecheng) in Sinkiang in 1957 with almost 900 kms being 4000 mts above sea level and 130 km above 5000 msl — no easy feat in those days.

The issue came up for discussion in the Parliament on April 22, 1959 and Nehru is alleged to have said that 'not a blade of grass grew there’. It was only in August 1959 that Nehru announced that the 'Tibet-Sinkiang highway' had been built through Indian territory. Other lands ceded include a cluster of villages around Mount Kailash and Mansarovar that were under the protection of the Maharaja of Kashmir for Hindu and Buddhist pilgrims travelling to the area. We have not staked a claim to this region since the 1960s.

Lessons From Chinese History

How could have we better dealt with their unprovoked aggression and unilateral withdrawal in 1962? There are a few salutary lessons from ancient Chinese history that help put Chinese cultural habits in perspective — very much like how India's strategy is shaped by Indian epics and history.

During the era of the seven Warring States corresponding to the Chanakya period in India, the state of Qi was threatened by the army of Wei. The Wei believed that Qi soldiers were cowards; that contempt and underestimation was to prove their downfall. Soldiers of Qi entered Wei territory in large numbers to challenge them. While doing so, they cannily reduced visible campfires in stages to make it appear to the Wei that Qi soldiers were deserting. It was a tactic that worked brilliantly as the Wei General attacked in haste and ran straight into a well-planned ambush — Qi archers at a narrow pass. Realising he had been tricked, the Wei General killed himself.

Could India have achieved something similar in 1962? If we had not lost our nerve and waited for a little longer instead of retreating, could it be that the Chinese, and not Indians, would be fending off narratives of lost battles today? The Indians were undoubtedly paralysed by poor leadership, both in Delhi and in the field — Nehru's nominee Lt Gen Kaul had no experience of battle. Had Indians played the game as was envisaged in Exercise Lal Quila rehearsed by Gen Thimayya and Gen Thorat, who was recommended to be the Army Chief, we would have been prepared for the Chinese. The history of that war would have been very different. We would have been the Qi, whom the Wei underestimated at their own peril.

Nonetheless, our actions — or the lack of it — underscored our weakness and willingness to endure greater indignity, threats and attacks when dealing with China. To hand your adversaries easy psychological and territorial victories is to invite them to try again, with impunity.

Conversely, one of the greatest mistakes when facing Chinese aggression is overreaction, and in this, we play our cards well, and with reserve until this day. Often the main dilemma is whether or not to go on the offensive to appease domestic anger; it’s an option fraught with the possibility of irreversible losses if we, as a nation, go in unprepared.

How To Change The Old Narrative

We must challenge and change the India-China narrative we have played so far, and find ways to turn our perceived weaknesses into our advantage. That begins with a reality check and the deconstruction of a few myths.

China may seem powerful because of its financial capabilities and its ability to build and nurture relationships with international governments and organisations that further its interests. That is both an intimidating perception as well as a potential weakness, because they have rarely been challenged. If India acts in a multi-pronged manner that neutralises that perception, China can be made to appear weak.

Could we draw them into a situation where they cannot use their perceived strengths — where these strengths become a disadvantage? There may be a lesson here from Japan, and the 16th-century art of the Shinkage-ryu samurai. Mirroring an enemy’s moves to understand his strategy and thinking, gives the samurai a powerful method of counterattack — giving an aggressive opponent back what they give you. It is reverse intimidation and India must perfect the art.

Chinese methods and patterns of intimidation work today because China sees India as being weak and vulnerable. But India is neither weak nor vulnerable and events in Nathula in 1967, Sumondrong Chu in 1987, and Doklam recently show that we can stand up to that aggression.

Action has much more credibility than threatening or fiery words. A measured hitting back will demonstrate that it is not business as usual with India anymore.

New World, New Tactics

Despite the very accommodating spirit displayed right from Panchsheel to Wuhan, repeated incursions and provocations cry out for a need to find a better way to challenge the pattern of continued Chinese aggression. When it comes to India-China relations, India has largely played a sane and subdued role. Both the countries need to assess what they represent to the world. The outcome of any hostile engagement between these two countries that together account for a third of the total global population, could define the very future of the human race. Both need to see the opportunities they can offer each other to create a bright future for the rest of the world in these testing times — despite the fact that the boundary issue is likely to remain a stumbling block.

Many Indian and Chinese companies have been quick to recognise the complementary strengths they bring to mutual advantage. China is currently struggling with negative international perceptions post-pandemic. With anti-China sentiments running high in many countries, it can ill-afford a war at this point. India could both effectively reduce the trade imbalance as well as hurt China financially. Trade bodies are powerful forces to reckon with and by their independent action they deliver powerful economic consequences. Indian trade bodies who have the local market access needs in mind have initiated a review of the imports over the past couple of years and are listing/focusing on those imports which are high-volume and low tech/complexity, and thus provide import substitution alternatives.

On that note, the Confederation of All India Traders (CAIT) — which represents around 7 crore traders — announced that it will launch a nationwide campaign from 10 June to replace and completely boycott Chinese goods. The initiatives taken by some state governments are offering alternatives to companies seeking to relocate from mainland china.

It is obvious that in the event of an intractable conflict, trade relationships will take a hit as it is an integral part of the plan of battle with any country. Secondly, a lot of imports from China are pass-through imports, such as those via Hong Kong. Indian trade bodies are considering a review of this route, especially given the current situation in that former city—state, and find alternate modes of import. This is similar to the recent India-Malaysia palm oil episode where the latter had found itself in hot water after supporting Pakistan on Article 370.

Another area is electronics where India is rapidly becoming a force to reckon with. This area is Taiwan's forte and India could increasingly leverage Taiwan's expertise to collaborate with them. Taiwan is a touchy issue with the Chinese, so China will be hurting in more ways than one if Indian traders shun an increasingly aggressive China and choose to go with Taiwan.

A Dose of Its Own Medicine

China enjoys significant diplomatic relationships and influences. Tackling years of China’s influence-building is going to be an issue for India. Taking on this influence would have to be an integral part of any battle plan. The next two years will see India playing a major role in the World Health Organization (WHO). India can still support the moves to seek a just and transparent review of the role of Wuhan biotech labs in Covid-19.

China has been a singular source of backing for Pakistan's activities, turning a blind eye to its intransigence on supporting terrorism against India. There are a lot of disturbing stories emanating from Hong Kong and Tibet. India can put these stories to good use to give China a taste of its own medicine. Such moves could include speaking up for Uighurs in China and Balochs in Pakistan.

India in the past has been mindful of Chinese sensitivities. The Chinese already have ongoing disputes with their neighbours, particularly the Japanese, the Vietnamese and in the South China Sea. The signing of an agreement for mutual logistics support with the Australians is not a fallout of any alliance nor is it aimed against China. India enjoys a unique relationship with Singapore which again has an unusual MoU on use of Indian facilities. India also enjoys time-tested defence and economic relations with Japan and Vietnam. All these are successful and vibrant nations. Increasing engagements with these nations can be leveraged to make China realise that India has moved ahead and is not what it was in 1962.

Resetting The Rules of Engagement

While delivering the statement on the NEFA enquiry on 02 Sept 1963, the then Defence Minister YB Chavan had said, "Initial reverses are a part of the tides of war and what matters most is who wins the last battle...what happened at Sela and Bomdila were severe reverses for us, but we must remember that other countries with powerful defence forces have sometimes suffered in the initial stages of war."

The truth is that the last battle was never fought in 1962 as the Chinese withdrew just as hastily as they had attacked. That was the safest thing a military strategist would have done with the severe Himalayan winter approaching and understanding that the Indian Air Force would eventually be employed to India’s advantage.

As I said at the beginning, a war has to be judged twice. The impact of the war was the downsizing planned by Nehru; besides, the plans to use soldiers for nation-building was shelved. Subsequent wars, skirmishes and standoffs have consistently proven that Indian Army had reversed the humiliation of defeat inflicted by bad leadership. India has never gone back to what it was in 1962, particularly in the past few years.

China should be inspired to give up its aggression with India, given the immense potential of collaboration and cooperation between the two giants and economic powerhouses. India can mirror its moves and sensitivities in multiple issues. Added to that is the support China renders to countries that many in the world see as belonging to “ an axis of evil” - rogue nuclear states North Korea and Pakistan, whose activities are under a watch list. China needs to recognize that the last 70 years have been an aberration in a mutually beneficial relationship that goes back nearly 2000 years, with strong economic, religious, and cultural ties based on mutual respect and admiration.

The last meeting between Modi and Xi took place in Mamallapuram. This was the port from which thriving trade took place between two of the mightiest dynasties in India and China - Cholas and the Song . Taking the spirit of that site forward, it is only appropriate that India and China recognise what cooperation and not confrontation can achieve for themselves and the rest of the world.

**The tragedy occurred during the period when 2 Jat was being replaced by 1st Bn Maratha Light Infantry but the taking-over was delayed due to incessant rain and Major Nagal continued to stay in Gyantse. 2nd Lt Bulbul Brar (Later Maj Gen and the Div Comdr during Op Blue Star) was detailed to recover the bodies and cremate them. Major Nagal's son, Lt Gen BS Nagal, later rose to be Strategic Forces Commander and was the Director of the Indian Army think tank CLAWS

The author, a recipient of Shaurya Chakra, is a Research Fellow at the Manohar Parikkar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses