China's Aggression At Border & Nepal’s New Maps Are Not Coincidental
Nepal's newfound aggression may be part of a bigger plan. Time to brace for bad news from the west too? The Chinese side is focusing on the Galwan standoff, painting India as the aggressor
by Indrani Bagchi
Whatever else it may be, the current India-China stand-off/skirmish in Ladakh and Sikkim is not “normal”. And we should not lull ourselves into thinking it is.
By now, the timeline of the flare-up is fairly clear — on May 5-6, Indian and Chinese troops clashed with stones, punches and fisticuffs near Pangong Tso in eastern Ladakh, resulting in some Indian soldiers being tossed in the water and some injuries requiring treatment in Leh, more than 200 km away.
The second incident happened on May 9 at Naku La, ahead of Muguthang in Sikkim. According to one account, it involved almost 200 soldiers, culminating apparently with a young Indian lieutenant giving a bloody nose to a Chinese major.
The more unusual transgression happened in Ladakh’s Galwan valley, a place where an Indian patrol was stopped by hundreds of Chinese soldiers, leading to a stand-off that continues, with men and material having been reinforced.
The Chinese side is focusing on the Galwan standoff, painting India as the aggressor. In an article, its official Global Times newspaper accused Indian troops of crossing over into Chinese territory, and swore to protect their sovereignty. In typical Chinese style, they predicted India would regret its actions, “…the Galwan Valley is not like Doklam because it is in the Aksai Chin region in southern Xinjiang of China, where the Chinese military has an advantage and mature infrastructure. So, if India escalates the friction, the Indian military force could pay a heavy price.”
From the Indian point of view,the troubling fact has been what sources say is an ingress by Chinese troops several kilometres into the north bank of the Pangong Tso, a disputed area, with one-third of the lake under Indian control. According to sources, Chinese troops have advanced into what is known as Finger 4 (Indian troops used to patrol up to Finger 6 and 7) and are reportedly using earth-moving machines to build barracks and bunkers and have even planted a flag, which, security sources say, could be a first. The Indian side, too, has brought in reinforcements and everybody has dug in— the Chinese side has little room to manoeuvre but neither do the Indians. And as far as India is concerned, there is a Chinese flag on what is patently Indian territory.
China expert Jayadeva Ranade writes: “The areas across Chushul and Koyul-Demchok in Ladakh, and Naku La, in north Sikkim, are under the overall jurisdiction of the PLA Western Theatre Command — the largest of the five Theatre Commands in China — but come under different military regions.”
Meanwhile, a sub-plot emerged with Nepal suddenly upping the ante on a Nepal-India-China trijunction point at Lipulekh Pass. After Defence Minister Rajnath Singh inaugurated a road to Lipulekh early May, Kathmandu threw a fit, claimed a broad area, including Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura, and issued new political maps which openly claim Indian territory. The Indian Army Chief, General MM Naravane, hinted that Nepal PM KP Sharma Oli might be doing it at China’s “behest”. He was right. Indian security establishment is also prepping for an unexpected attack by Pakistan from the west, perhaps in the form of another terror strike. Pakistan PM Imran Khan’s tweet, claiming India would carry out a “false flag” attack and blame Pakistan did not go unnoticed.
What’s Going On, And Why?
To everyone who says these skirmishes happen every summer, or that these don’t mean much, or that no bullets were exchanged, that explanation is past its sell-by date. If bunkers and other fortifications are being built on disputed points in sub-sector north (SSN) and sub-sector south (near Demchok), this is no midsummer madness.
China has opened up the border in all three sectors — in Sikkim, Ladakh and via Nepal in Uttarakhand. Some reports said China was trying to build a road along the Amo Chu in Bhutanese territory. Clearly, the intention is to put India under pressure
To be sure, China’s regional aggression is Covid-proof. From Japan to Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines and Taiwan, everyone has had to push back against Beijing’s marauding missions.
Witness China’s savage slam against Australia, open criticism of Taiwan and a new national security law for Hong Kong which will surely strangle it.
China could be concerned about Aksai Chin, after India reorganised Jammu & Kashmir in August 2019. This might explain their probing missions and stand-offs in the Ladakh area.
India, while still under-resourced, is no longer a pushover, having emerged stronger and wiser from the Depsang incident of 2013, when Chinese troops pitched tents to establish their control over the area. India has been building a road along the Galwan river to Daulat Beg Oldie that would improve India’s access to the Karakoram Highway, as well as 61 border roads with a total length of 3,346 km across the Himalayan frontier. The Indian Air Force’s capabilities have improved as well.
It is unlikely that the current flare-up has much to do with India’s new foreign investment rules (shutting the automatic route for countries that share a border with India), or for that matter the burgeoning India-US relationship. Unlike Doklam, when India had asked the US to keep its support silent, this time India will not be unhappy if the US openly takes up cudgels on its behalf. This could exacerbate things, given the downward spiral of US-China ties currently.
Lastly, China is in the midst of its annual “2 Sessions” of the CPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Process) and NPC (National People’s Congress), where the ruling sentiment is how China is being bold and tough. Hong Kong was an example of that sentiment. It is likely the India moves may be related. No softening or reasonableness can be expected from China until the NPC ends.
China is, as usual, changing the ground realities to influence a future boundary agreement. Do all or any of these provide a justification for Chinese actions? They don’t, clearly. India has been careful to save face on previous occasions. Public opinion may call for more robust handling this time.
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