Soleimani’s ‘termination’ was the second most important event in the tensed history of US-Iran confrontation in the past four decades, after the Iranian action of storming the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and taking 52 US diplomats as hostages

by Brig LC Patnaik (Retd)

The news of ‘termination’ of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, the external wing of the ‘Pasdaran’ in the Islamic Republic Guard Corps, by a US drone strike in Baghdad on January 2 brought back a personal memory.

In the late summer of 2005, India had voted against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), casting aspersions on Iran’s claim of peaceful nuclear research. This shocked Iranians as they considered India to be one of their closest friends with a strong historical linkage. In one of the extraordinary meetings with Iranian armed forces officials, I explained that our stand at Vienna was based on larger politico-military considerations and stability of the region.

The tension was defused and stern faces turned pleasant when a Brigadier General, in a green coat and without name tabs and ribbons, sitting in a corner, smiled and assured that Iran would remain a friend of India. It was only a few weeks later that the identity of the officer was confirmed from a reliable source, who said the officer was Brig Gen (later Maj Gen) Qassem Soleimani, a relatively lesser known figure in those days, and that this was his “way of dropping in” at important meetings.

Soleimani’s ‘termination’ was the second most important event in the tensed history of US-Iran confrontation in the past four decades, after the Iranian action of storming the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and taking 52 US diplomats as hostages.

Soleimani, popularly known as ‘Haji Qassem’, was a rare combination of a wily soldier and a suave diplomat. He was a close associate of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who refers to him as “a living martyr of the Revolution”. His proximity to Khamenei commenced in the wake of his adept handling of Hezbollah in forcing Israel to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000, after 16 years of occupation. He soon rose in the inner hierarchy of the Islamic regime to head the Quds Force, an important instrument in shaping the foreign policy of Iran. Much of the developments that shaped Iran’s influence in West Asia in the past two decades are believed to be Soleimani’s brainchild.

During 1999-2002, he worked for a close alliance with the US for impending operations in Afghanistan and facilitating information and technical intelligence of Taliban groups. Unfortunately, a policy statement of President George Bush in 2002, condemning Iran as an ‘Axis of Evil’, thwarted most of his initiatives, forcing a change in the course of political turmoil in West Asia.

The ‘termination’ of Soleimani, a serving military officer of a sovereign country, has added a new dimension to diplomacy, international cooperation and military alliances amongst nations. The US has justified its action as one to protect US citizens and to prevent a war. However, unlike in the past, now there is the ‘China factor’ to contend with.

Earlier, China maintained a balanced position in the US-Iraq nuclear confrontation, considering its close commercial links with the US and its oil dependence on Iran. In the past one year, emergence of a ‘New Cold War’ on tariff dispute, military posturing in the South China sea and the US desire to contain China’s Belt and Road Initiative with a perceived aim of extending influence across Euro-Asia has reshaped US geopolitical strategy in West Asia. The US apparently wants to de-escalate in other regions and parts of West Asia and focus on Iran with the help of Saudi Arabia and its other allies.

It appears the centre of gravity of the new power rivalry between the US and China is likely to be either Iraq or Iran. What is most notable is the recent joint naval manoeuvres between Russia, China and Iran (three countries under US sanctions) in the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean. These indicate that both China and Russia are unlikely to be with the US either in the UN Security Council or in any politico-military alliance should the confrontation escalate into a conflict. Hence, despite all rhetoric of revenge and punishment between Khamenei and President Donald Trump, a full-scale war between the two countries is unlikely.

Militarily, US air strikes cannot inflict heavy damage on military targets as Iran has mastered the art of concealment of its strategic assets in mountains, valleys and deserts. Moreover, the existing troop presence (70,000) in the region is inadequate for a land offensive.

In the coming few weeks, the US will escalate its troop deployment in the region to protect its assets. It appears that the stability of the US in Iraq would be difficult without reoccupation and expansion of bases. Iran, along with other militia groups like Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shaabi and Qais al-Khazali, supported by Moqtadr-al-Sadr, would endeavour to draw new battle lines to gain strategic depth in Iraq. The US may find it hard to form an international coalition after its unilateral pullout from the Iran nuclear deal and the ‘China factor’.

As the mangled body of Soleimani, who had achieved a mythical status in West Asia, is lowered in the grave in his native town of Kerman , the region should brace itself for a long period of hostility, instability and turbulence. Soleimani was a friend of India who assisted India in operating with the Northern Alliance and took a neutral stand on India’s voting against Iran in the IAEA. To honour his memory, India needs to be more proactive in the region and abandon its stance of neutrality.

India’s interests in the region are dynamic and similar to those of China. Hence, there is a need to reach out to both the US and Iran to prevent escalation of conflict while remaining prepared for ‘uncontrolled’ action by the militias. India needs to act proactively with China and Russia and exercise its newfound bonhomie with Saudi Arabia to ensure stability. The Indian Navy and Air Force need to be ready for evacuation of Indians (about 1,500) from airfields and ports located in Southern Iran. Fortunately, the Indian government has laid down contingencies for such eventualities.