Taking a lesson from the past, India should resist re-engaging with Pakistan

by Sushant Sareen

The one thing that never ceases to surprise is how little India and Pakistan know about each other and how little they understand each other. The level of ignorance about each other is truly astounding and is reflected in the calculations they make, the compulsions they think the other side faces, and intentions they believe are driving and guiding not just the policy-making, but even more, the peace overtures of the other side.

Given that just over 70 years ago India and Pakistan were one country, and given the commonality in language, even custom, it would have been expected of India to have at least developed a degree of expertise on Pakistan which would allow it to interpret every nuance, gesture, trick and treachery of its neighbour from hell. And yet, despite the animosity that exists between the peoples and establishments of the two countries, and the decades of enmity, wars and tensions, neither country seems to have a good measure of the other. If anything, it appears as though each country deals with the other in a context that is make-believe, conjured up in their own minds with little or no bearing to reality on the ground.

Despite the animosity that exists between the peoples and establishments of the two countries, and the decades of enmity, wars and tensions, neither country seems to have a good measure of the other.

After a hiatus of a couple of years, there is once again talk in the air about a possible re-engagement between India and Pakistan. An incipient effort appears underway to smoothen the path for talks by softening public opinion in India. Suddenly there is a flurry of planted stories in the Indian media handing out certificates of good behaviour to Pakistan. The Indian public is now being told that terrorist camps have been shut in Pakistan and Pakistan is starting to move against the terrorist infrastructure in that country. This, it is believed, should make the prospects of restarting some sort of a dialogue with Pakistan more palatable, even acceptable. After all, if Pakistan has started to address India’s concerns on terrorism, the main obstacle on the path to talks will have been removed. But is this actually happening or is India being led up the garden path, yet again?

The sort of actions purportedly being taken by Pakistan—and which are being sold in India as a sign of Pakistan turning over a new leaf—are not new. Every time Pakistan is under pressure and finds itself with its back to the wall, it undertakes these actions to create some space for itself, and buy some time. And invariably, India falls for this caper, hook, line and sinker, only to realise that is has been had, yet again.

Every time Pakistan is under pressure and finds itself with its back to the wall, it undertakes these actions to create some space for itself, and buy some time. And invariably, India falls for this caper, hook, line and sinker, only to realise that is has been had, yet again.

But the fact of the matter remains that, at least from India’s point of view, this is the worst possible time to re-engage Pakistan. Because, to do so would be to lose whatever new ground has been broken over the last few years in raising the costs for Pakistani jihadist adventurism.

More than the actions of Pakistan against jihadists (which are at best cosmetic and can be flipped anytime), it is the more fundamental, even flawed, assumptions about Pakistan that seem to be prompting a re-evaluation of the policy to not enter into a desultory dialogue and keep up the pressure on that country. But these flawed assumptions are not just on the Indian side. Pakistan’s overtures for re-engaging India too are a function of similarly flawed assessment. And this is the great disconnect between the two countries which makes them enter into an engagement process in with each side comes to the table with notions that are akin to skew lines, i.e. not only having no point of intersection but also on different planes.

As the thinking (or, if you will, delusion) goes in India, Pakistan has been pushed to a point where it is now weak and suing for peace. Its economy is on the ropes, so much so that it is having to cut its defence budget in real terms if not nominal terms. Continued confrontation with India is for now unaffordable for Pakistan. The right choice for India is to seize this moment and offer an honourable peace. This sort of thinking betrays a mindset that suffers from a combination of the Prithiviraj Chauhan syndrome (treat the enemy honourably so that she can come back and beat the hell out of you in the future) and the Treaty of Versailles syndrome (don’t impose terms on an enemy that will force her to rise and take revenge in the future). This is something that has dogged India’s ability to forge a robust policy on Pakistan.

Even so, India has convinced itself that the Balakot airstrikes were a game changer that made Pakistan smell the coffee that the use of jihadist proxies has run its course. Along with Balakot, the mounting pressure of international institutions like the FATF have only added to the pressure on Pakistan to drain the swamps of terrorism that it has nurtured for decades. Add all this and it is easy to convince yourself that the time is ripe for another gamble on normalising ties with Pakistan.

The only problem with the Indian assessment and calculus is that Pakistan sees the situation very differently. In the Pakistani calculus, despite the economic crisis and international pressure, they very much remain in the fray. Not only that, they think that Balakot and the subsequent air skirmish has actually given them a leg up on India. According to Pakistan, they came out looking better in the clash by downing an Indian fighter and getting Indian military targets in their cross-hairs (they claim they shot two Indian fighters and flatly deny that one of their F-16s was also shot down). The fact that India didn’t escalate after the Pakistani air attack is seen by Pakistan as having established their ability, even superiority, to keep India at bay.

Therefore, quite opposite to how India sees the situation, Pakistan thinks they have established their strength and restored the confidence of their people in their ability to stand up to India.

Their peace overture is therefore not out of weakness but because it will work for them by creating space for them, buying time, and winning some diplomatic brownie points. In the Pakistani calculus, post Balakot and post the Modi re-election, they believe they are well-placed to combine the Nixon-China model with the Egypt-Israel model where an Anwar Sadat could deal with the Israelis after proving his credentials in the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Imran Khan apparently believes that Modi has the political capital to strike a deal on Kashmir. While Modi’s political standing is undisputed, where the Pakistanis have lost the plot is in imagining that someone like Modi will barter India's sovereignty or territorial integrity in exchange for the lemon of Pakistan’s perfidious friendship.

The right choice for India is to seize this moment and offer an honourable peace. This sort of thinking betrays a mindset that suffers from a combination of the Prithiviraj Chauhan syndrome (treat the enemy honourably so that she can come back and beat the hell out of you in the future) and the Treaty of Versailles syndrome (don’t impose terms on an enemy that will force her to rise and take revenge in the future).

To the extent that re-engaging with India reduces tensions and buys Pakistan time is a bit of a gamble for the Pakistanis. Even as they dismiss talk of India engaging with them from a position of strength because they have established a stalemate for now, they are aware that this stalemate won’t last forever. Even if India fills the gaps which became glaring during the air skirmish, the stalemate will last at least a couple of years. The way Pakistan sees it, a lot can change in this time. Their economic woes might end. Their time-tested “geography for alms” strategy might bail them out again; the international situation might turn in their favour; the flux in geostrategy might see them once again playing mercenary for some patron or benefactor which in turn will help them build up their military capability to counter India. In the meantime, they can make a play to keep tensions down by engaging India in a meaningless but also meretricious dialogue which keeps the people, politicians and policy makers involved in a senseless spectacle.

Just as India will take time to fill the gaps in its capabilities, Pakistan’s capabilities vis-à-vis India are not going to be significantly affected by the freeze on the defence budget in one year. If the budgetary cuts persist over a few years, Pakistan’s armed forces will start feeling the squeeze, but only if India is able to get its act together and build the capabilities that outmatch and outgun Pakistan. Therefore those in India who are exulting over the freezing of the Pakistani defence budget are celebrating a bit prematurely. In other words, anyone who thinks that Pakistan's defence budget remaining static in nominal terms for one year is enough to force the Pakistanis to sue for peace are living in cuckoo land.

Indian policymakers and their spin doctors, who are trying to give the impression that this is a propitious time to once again engage the Pakistanis, are living in an alternate reality. Pakistan isn’t imploding—not yet anyway. Pakistan’s economic crisis is real and palpable but it isn’t fatal—not yet anyway. Pakistan's diplomatic isolation is apparent but isn’t absolute—not yet anyway. None of these factors should be exaggerated to a point where India deludes itself and loses sight of ground realities.

Modi’s decision to up the ante in Balakot introduced a completely new dimension to how India reacts to Pakistan's export of terrorism, a dimension that exponentially raises the costs and risks of Pakistanis Jihadi adventurism.

While Balakot did have a shock and awe effect, Pakistan’s riposte and India’s refusal to go up the escalation ladder created a stalemate. Modi’s decision to up the ante in Balakot introduced a completely new dimension to how India reacts to Pakistan's export of terrorism, a dimension that exponentially raises the costs and risks of Pakistanis Jihadi adventurism. But Balakot wasn’t conclusive in establishing India’s dominance to a point that Pakistan would be left with no choice but to sue for peace on India’s terms, much less give up its irredentism on Jammu and Kashmir. With very little having changed in terms of the balance of power, for anyone to think that a dialogue with Pakistan at this point of time will result in something positive is nothing but self-deception of the worst kind.

Post Uri and post Pulwama, India has started ratcheting up the pressure on Pakistan along multiple axes. This policy is still in its nascent stages. To imagine that this policy has worked and reached fruition is simply crazy. This is a policy that will take time, years, maybe even a decade or two to play out. Until that happens, India needs to keep pressing Pakistan and increase the cost and pain of its confrontation with India. Anything else will tantamount to repeating the follies of the past with results that will be no different from those in the past.