America has a large troop presence in Afghanistan

US-Taliban talks have moved forward after Taliban appointed Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar as the lead negotiator from their side. India will be deeply affected by the outcome of these talks, yet it is not at the table, nor is it being heard

NEW DELHI: With the US and Taliban making “significant” progress in their talks in Doha, India’s own position on the Taliban is coming under scrutiny.

According to reports that are mainly attributed to Taliban sources, the US-Taliban talks have moved forward after Taliban appointed Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar as the lead negotiator from their side. There has been talk of a ceasefire, as US negotiator, Zalmay Khalilzad said, some have talked of a US withdrawal in 18 months, others have said the Taliban has committed to not prove sanctuary to Al Qaeda and Daesh among other international terror groups. Khalilzad himself ruled out any talk of an “interim” government, emphasising he was trying to facilitate an intra-Afghan dialogue. But, as he has himself tweeted, nothing is done until it is done.

India will be deeply affected by the outcome of these talks, yet it is not at the table, nor is it being heard.

The Army chief, Gen Bipin Rawat’s bold suggestion that India steps on to the “bandwagon” by talking to the Taliban in Afghanistan because everyone else is doing it, has made the MEA establishment deeply uncomfortable.

India has been on the defensive regarding Afghanistan in the recent past — first, to counter Donald Trump ridicule on India building “libraries” in Afghanistan, then Rawat’s unsolicited comment. Pakistan’s official spokesperson trotted out the old line that India has “no role” in Afghanistan, echoed by a NATO official Alejandro Alvargonzález that India was just one among “hundreds” in Afghanistan, while Pakistan held all the cards. The MEA spokesperson defended the Indian official position with the same mantra on “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” peace process. “Our position on Afghanistan has been very clear and very consistent. We have said in the past and we continue to do so that India supports the peace and reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan ... that is inclusive," Raveesh Kumar said.

What has changed has been the US-Taliban talks led by special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad. In addition, the “leak” that the US may be drawing down in Afghanistan by about 7000 forces has galvanized all the regional players to start different tacks to put a foot into the door, by making themselves part of the peace process. Iran has jumped in, negotiating a peace deal with the Taliban. Russia is marketing its “Moscow Format” as the forum to be in. Pakistan believes it is back in the saddle as the only country to have supported the Taliban all these years and can call the shots to get the Islamist group to the table, in the process carving out its own strategic depth in Afghanistan against India.

In his conversations with Indian leaders, Khalilzad stressed that the US would maintain its existing red lines for peace in Afghanistan. He added that there would be more pressure on Pakistan to “deliver”. The US would want the Taliban to distance itself from the Haqqani Network, which is directly under Pakistan’s control, a deadly terror group that has repeatedly attacked US and Indian interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan cleverly inserted Sirajuddin Haqqani as the vice chief of Taliban after Mullah Omar’s death, in a bid to whitewash him — the US has never labeled Taliban as a terror group but its guns are trained on the Haqqani network. Extricating one from the other is impossible. How will the US “reconcile” with the Taliban when its chief is a Haqqani?

India, in these years, has built enormous goodwill in Afghanistan, despite not having “boots on the ground”. It has remained on the side of the Afghan government, built infrastructure and rebuilt relations with the Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan. However, just the fact that there appear to be two distinct schools of thought within the national security establishment in India is significant.

To the clamour that India needs to “engage” the Taliban, the MEA plans to hold a steady line. Whether India maintains a covert line to the Taliban, for the moment New Delhi will stand by Kabul and will open communications with Taliban after Kabul does so. This group believes that India’s brand equity, built over the past 17 years, will be enough to secure Indian interests in Afghanistan.

The army chief was reflecting the views of another group that believes that India should maintain some contact with the Taliban. “If Pakistan is successful in putting its own people in government in Kabul, India can expect to witness the destruction of all the assets it has built there, like the Bamiyan Buddhas,” said high-level sources.

Regional powers don’t have a clear path forward either. Iran flirted with the Taliban against the US, but after the US leaves, the divisions between them will naturally sharpen. Russia will be in a similar position because no matter what Moscow says, the Taliban and Daesh have been known to share resources in some parts of Afghanistan — this means Moscow, by helping the Taliban, may, unwittingly be giving space to their real enemy, Daesh. China wants action against ETIM (Uighur group) but Beijing has had to swallow the fact that a lot of ETIM’straining camps are helped by Taliban elements in Pakistan. Daesh is growing as a terror group in Afghanistan, but they are seen mainly as disaffected members of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). That brings a whole new level of action and reaction in the region.

China will continue to support Pakistan regardless. Pakistan is already in the suds on terrorism and despite the general feeling of triumph in Islamabad this is likely to continue. ImranKhan secured promises of support from Saudi Arabia and UAE for his faltering economy, but sources said, this has come with a number of conditions. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s ability to play the old double game is getting constrained every day. Any Afghan government in Kabul, whether Ashraf Ghani-Saleh or Hanif Atmar-Qanooni is likely to take an anti-Islamabad position.

India’s stakes in Afghanistan at its most basic is two — helping Afghanistan stand on its feet and thwarting Pakistan’s designs of strategic depth and an installing an anti-India establishment there. The first does not envisage seeing the Taliban in power in Kabul. The second is aimed at reducing Pakistan’s ability to run terror groups against India. The government at present believes that even without talking directly to the Taliban, it can continue to play an effective game. Nobody is quite sure whether this is confidence or bravado.