by Gurmeet Kanwal

When he was India’s Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar had said two years ago that he would ‘soon’ recommend the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), which he considered “a must”, to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). He had also said that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was engaged in working out a mechanism for the post. So far there has been no progress on appointing a CDS and constituting integrated theatre commands.

Consequent to the submission of the Kargil Review Committee report, a group of ministers (GoM) headed by then Deputy Prime Minister LK. Advani had analysed the functioning of the higher defence organisation in India. Among the major recommendations of this GoM was the establishment of the post of CDS with a tri-Service joint planning staff HQ. The CCS accepted this recommendation but held its implementation in abeyance. The two reasons cited for the deferment were the lack of political consensus on the need for a CDS and opposition within certain sections of the armed forces and the bureaucracy. More recently, the Naresh Chandra committee is reported to have recommended the appointment of a ‘permanent’ chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) as the first among equals.

While the army and the navy are known to support the idea of a CDS and theatre commands, many senior officers of the Indian Air Force (IAF) oppose the move. General Bikram Singh, former army chief, wrote recently that an “empowered CDS” is needed to draw up a “pragmatic architecture for integrated tri-Service theatre commands”. (”A Fresh Security Strategy is Needed”, Hindustan Times, August 28, 2018.) Admiral Arun Prakash, former naval chief, has written often about the need for reform in higher defence organisations at the apex level. Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy, former air chief, opposes the concept of CDS has written that theatre commands are unnecessary (“Why Theatre Commands is an Unnecessary Idea”, Indian Express, August 16, 2018). About a year ago, Air Marshal Vinod Patney had written in a similar vein (“Unity of the Services”, Indian Express, May 10, 2017). 

It is well known that the operational plans of the armed forces lack synergy. In 1962, the IAF was not given any role to play during the war with China when it could have wreaked havoc on the Chinese hordes that had concentrated on the Tibetan Plateau without air cover. In 1965, the Indian Navy (IN) was not even informed about the plans to launch a three-pronged attack across the international boundary (IB) into Pakistan.

It is repeated ad nauseum that the 1971 war was a well-coordinated tri-Service effort that led to a grand victory. The rather limited coordination that was actually achieved during the wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 was mainly due to the personalities of the Chiefs in position of authority and not due to any institutionalised arrangements. During the 1971 war, Field Marshal Sam Maneckshaw was able to carry his naval and air force colleagues with him due to the personal rapport that he had established with them. Yet, there were several glitches in the planning and conduct of the land and air campaigns and it cannot be stated that India fought a coordinated "air-land" war.

The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka was undoubtedly a disaster from the joint planning point of view. The Kargil conflict of 1999 is the only real example of a coordinated effort. Even here there were initial hiccups and it took the IAF several weeks to begin bombing the Pakistani intruders’ sangars (ad hoc bunkers) on the Indian side of the LoC after the army had made such a request.

India's prevailing security environment is marked by regional instability with a nuclear overhang, unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, an active Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, Pakistan’s proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir, repeated air space violations, burgeoning maritime security challenges and increasing demands for Indian contribution to multinational coalition forces. More than ever before, it is now necessary for the national security decision makers to be given "single-point military advice" that takes into account the operational strengths and weaknesses and the inter-dependence of each of the armed forces on the other to meet complex emerging challenges. Such advice can come only from an empowered CDS.

Ideally, the CDS should be an overall commander-in-chief and not merely the first among equals with no forces under his command. From the CDS command should flow to individual theatre commanders who are in command of troops and equipment from all three Services. Given India’s long land borders with a varied terrain configuration and two major seaboards, a "theatre" system of tri-Service command is best suited for the optimum management of both external and internal security challenges. At present, HQ Eastern Command of the army is located at Kolkata while the corresponding HQ of the navy and the air force are at Visakhapatnam and Shillong, respectively.

A mis-perception has been created that only the United States needs a theatre system because of its wider Geo-political interests and involvement in security issues all over the globe. With its sprawling land borders, long coastlines and complex national security threats and challenges, India too needs a theatre system for integrated functioning to achieve synergy in operations by optimally exploiting limited resources. The Chinese, with similar needs, have a well-established theatre command system. While a single Chinese commander is responsible for operations against India, three Indian army commanders will be involved in the planning and conduct of operations against China.

Each theatre commander should have under his command forces from all the three Services based on the operational requirement. The initial allocation of forces will seldom remain constant. At the inception stage it would be more appropriate to appoint a CDS without simultaneously constituting theatre commands. The second step can follow a few years later. Once the new system matures and theatre commanders are appointed, the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services should have responsibility primarily for force structure and drawing up perspective plans. They should oversee the development and acquisition of weapons and equipment, plan recruitment, guide and coordinate training at specialised training establishments and control administrative matters such as the annual budget, pay and allowances, maintenance support and medical services etc.

Several other areas of functioning necessitate overarching military command and control at the national level. While India’s nuclear doctrine and policy are guided by the National Security Council and the Cabinet Committee on Security, their execution is entrusted to the Services and here a joint approach is mandatory. The Strategic Forces Command (SFC), constituted for the planning, coordination and control of India's nuclear weapons, must function directly under the CDS even while functional control over the nuclear warheads and the delivery systems comprising the "triad" remains with the civilian political leadership.

Aerospace, information warfare, cyber-security and issues like the management of the Electro-magnetic spectrum, including frequency management, Electro-magnetic compatibility (EMC), Electro-magnetic interference (EMI), electronic emission policy (EEP) and the offensive employment of non-communications devices such as radars for electronic warfare, should all be the legitimate domain of the CDS and HQ IDS. It is time to set up a tri-Service Aerospace and Cyber Command as well as a Special Forces Command to meet emerging challenges in these fields and to better manage all available resources. A tri-Service Logistics and Maintenance command has also been long overdue.

Similarly, on the non-operational side, training institutions such as the National Defence College, the College of Defence Management and the National Defence Academy and organisations like the Armed Forces Medical Services, Canteen Stores Department and a host of others must be placed under the direct command of the CDS for better synergy in their functioning and optimum exploitation of their potential. International experience shows that such reform has to be imposed from the top down and can never work if the government keeps waiting for it to come about from the bottom up.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) is an experiment that can only be described as partially successful. It is driven by single-Service requirements and perceptions. The Chairman, COSC, normally the senior most serving chief, has no executive authority over the other two Services. The COSC works primarily by consensus and cannot make hard decisions that would be binding on all the services. During peace time, turf battles and inter-Service rivalries rule the roost and minor, inconsequential issues take up most of the time available for discussion.

War-time decisions require professional understanding, a bi-partisan approach and, often, hard compromises. As Winston Churchill famously said, “Committees cannot fight wars.” It is time to implement the GoM recommendation to appoint a CDS. Theatre commands are but one step further in the quest for synergy in operations. It should be a short step, but the way the Indian system works, it is likely to be a very long one indeed.

Often during war, the fate of an entire campaign can hinge on a single decision. Such a decision can only be made by a specially selected defence chief and not by a committee like the COSC that operates on the principle of the least common denominator. Military history is replete with examples of how such decisions changed the course of a war. Eisenhower’s decision to launch the Normandy landings in the face of continuing rough weather and MacArthur’s decision to land at Inchon against stiff opposition from virtually his entire staff, could not have been made by committees. All other major democracies have opted for the CDS system. India cannot ignore it any further except at great peril. It is an idea whose time has come.

The author is former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi