The BSF plans to put up a CIBMS in areas all along the Indo-Pak and India-Bangladesh border

by RK Arora

Two pilot projects of Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS) in Jammu along the International Border (IB) between India and Pakistan are likely to be inaugurated this month. The CIBMS is an integration of a number of new gadgets and technologies to ensure electronic surveillance of India’s international borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The pilot projects of approximately 5 kilometres of the stretch each and costing around 6-7 crores per project are being handled by two private firms – TATA Power SED and DAT Con. The Border Security Force (BSF) hopes that the new technological equipment would provide feeds to BSF personnel at the border outposts, where monitors would be installed. In case of a threat, quick reaction teams (QRT) will intervene and neutralise it. The BSF plans to put up a CIBMS in areas all along the Indo-Pak and India-Bangladesh border, after successful completion of the pilot projects and their feedback, where it is a key challenge to secure the borders due to the nature of the terrain as well as to check cross-border infiltration and smuggling.

Use of latest surveillance technology to guard India’s porous IB needs to be appreciated as it is generally felt that the one who has better technology will dominate in the future. However, it is easier said than done considering India’s past experience with technology. The question is being asked repeatedly whether these solutions are compatible with Indian conditions and whether they are cost effective

At a time when implementation of similar solutions for the US-Mexico border has been facing several technical glitches and financial challenges, investment of a huge amount for implementation of the CIBMS needs to be revisited.

Futuristic planning has not always featured prominently in India’s border security architecture. As regards the CIBMS, there are several gray areas in the pilot projects which needs to be given due consideration. The fact that the inauguration of the pilot projects, which began in 2016, has been delayed should not be forgotten while going ahead with the full project.

Amid understandable enthusiasm for technological solutions, some hard realities need to be kept in mind. Let’s enumerate some of the challenges. First, the selection process for pilot projects has been under dispute. Moreover, there is a lack of clarity regarding the role of private vendors providing CIBMS technology. One of the firms, TATA Power SED claims the indigenous element in CIBMS as part of ‘Make in India’ endeavour.

If that is so, what about the local manufacturing of LORROS and Thermal Imagers except Hand Held Thermal Imagers (HHTI)? One need not forget that CIBMS’ multi-tier security ring at the border indents to use a variety of sensors, such as Thermal Imager, Radar, Aerostat, Optical Fiber Intrusion Detection System, Unattended Ground Sensor and Underwater Sensors. We have not heard much about how and when these equipment will get manufactured in India. Underground sensors can detect about 5 metres. 

Second, basic amenities have not been improved on the ground. In the recent past, the optimum use of sophisticated technical equipment has been weighed down by its incompatibility with terrain and existing border security infrastructure. This time serious questions have been raised about three-phase power supply and border road along with fencing. Power back-up of gensets is also a challenge which is yet to be addressed. Without plugging these loopholes, reaction capability of the QRT is going to be seriously compromised.

Third, helium-filled Aerostat balloons can provide an aerial 24/7 surveillance and communications, but they can also be an ideal shooting practice range for counter border guards. Moreover, one time use or refilling it is likely to cost approximately rupees one lakh, calling into question the financial sustainability of the project.

Fourth, lack of well-trained technical manpower is a nagging issue. Due to a rotational policy of the border guarding forces, the expertise acquired by the border personnel risks being lost as soon as the private firms leave the project site, hampering the technical capability.

Fifth, repair and maintenance is a vital aspect. The fact cannot be ignored that there is a strong correlation between sophisticated technology and human adaptability. What specific policy has been framed to integrate the technology being utilised for CIBMS with the technical manpower operating it? After all, everybody with considerable practically experience on border security in India’s context is painfully aware as to what actually happens when technical equipment in need of urgent repair are forced to remain unused for unusually long spells because of procedural and bureaucratic loopholes. Have they been plugged?

Conceptually speaking, there are four components involved in the project of the scale and magnitude of CIBMS – detection, identification, response and neutralisation. Detection and identification can be achieved through technological solutions, but their success depends on smooth integration with the response and neutralisation aspects which require robust human intervention.

Problematically, we have yet to develop institutional trust on technology, which can be reflected in simultaneous increase in technological and manpower footprint. Ideally speaking, technological intervention needs to edge out the human factor. But why this has not happened in India is because of very marginal investment in human capital in India’s border guarding forces even as the number of troops keeps expanding exponentially every year.

The scepticism of CIBMS naturally presents opportunities for introspection. The one area in which India is capable of carving out a leadership role for itself may well regarding integration between technology and human efforts, one in which India shows the way to the international community on how to lower the cost of border security, and in turn, counter terrorism.