by Nilesh Kunwar
"Look at my identity card; Pakistan (army) has issued this to me...I request, for God's sake, my father is disabled, and I am the eldest at home. Do not commit this injustice by saying that we're not your personnel" - Plea made by soldier captured by Baloch Liberation Army after the Pakistan army disowned him, February 2026.
Dead Disowned
It was during this very same month in 1999, that the Pakistan army’s top brass exposed barefaced apathy towards its rank and file killed in combat during the Kargil war by refusing to accept their dead bodies. Denied military honours and a final resting place in their own country, these dead army men were nevertheless lucky to receive military funerals in accordance with Islamic burial rites thanks to the Indian army.
27 years have since elapsed and though the Pakistan army has officially accepted its role in the Kargil war, it has made no efforts whatsoever to repatriate mortal remains of these soldiers, indicating the continuing disconnect between Generals in Rawalpindi and soldiers on the battlefield. And recent events in Balochistan further highlight the existence that its base mindset has turned far more perverse.
Abandoning The Living
On January 31, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) took seven Pakistan army soldiers in custody during Operation Herof-2 and videos in which these men in uniform were seen displaying their military issue identity cards and frantically appealing to the authorities for negotiating their release. BLA issued a seven- day ultimatum for negotiations for prisoner exchange and extended the same by another seven more days.
But the Pakistan army responded by saying that none of its soldiers were either missing or in custody of Baloch fighters. This categorical denial in itself should have put all speculation to rest, because if the seven men in uniform seen in the video weren’t Pakistan army soldiers then the question of any negotiations obviously didn’t arise. So, why did BLA demand negotiations for prisoner swap if it didn’t have Pakistan army men in its custody?
It may be contended that this could be a propaganda gimmick, which is definitely possible. However, those closely following developments in Balochistan are not inclined to believe this for a number of reasons. One, BLA values its spoken reputation and as such wouldn’t indulge in a puerile act of not only passing off imposters as Pakistan army personnel but even demanding a prisoner swap.
Next, the impassioned pleas of the seven uniformed men in the video giving out their personal particulars including home addresses and flashing their service identity cards leaves little room for doubting their military credentials. Furthermore, with CNN-New 18 quoting an unofficial response of the Pakistan army on this incident that stated, “The execution of Pakistan army soldiers by the BLA is not ‘war,’ it is cold-blooded murder,” is there still any room of doubt left?
Police Betrayed
On the night of July 6, BLA fighters attacked a police outpost in the Mangi dam area of Ziarat district. According to the Pakistan army’s media wing Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), the police men put up a valiant fight killing 15 attackers. However, the post was overwhelmed and while nine policemen died during the attack, 18 others were abducted by BLA before military reinforcements could arrive, and later killed.
Though seemingly comprehensive, ISPR’s version of this unfortunate incident nevertheless raises several questions.
Firstly, ISPR has claimed that the police men had killed 15 BLA fighters, which going by statistical attrition data indicates that the police men gave a tough and coordinated fight. Thus, the BLA still being able to overwhelm the post and abduct 18 policemen is something that doesn't sound very convincing as it suggests that somewhere during this fire-fight the police men just gave up and allowed themselves to be captured by BLA.
Secondly, as the area which this incident took place is remote, the abducted police men would have been moved on foot to some hideout during the night which would have been time consuming, and so they couldn’t have gone very far. As the Pakistan army has helicopters and drones with night vision capabilities, why these assets weren’t deployed to track down the BLA fighters defies comprehension.
Thirdly, while ISPR claims that the dead bodies of policemen were retrieved by security forces, Pakistani media has reported that due to “delays in official recovery operations,” the same was done by families of the deceased. This has also been confirmed by many on social media and the question that arises is-- why did the Pakistan army which is overseeing operations in Balochistan display such apathy in a life-and-death situation?
Lastly, the death of policemen in attacks by armed groups in Balochistan is a harsh reality that everyone accepts, and that’s why, though tragic, the Mangi dam police outpost incident was no different from numerous similar attacks on policemen in the past. So, the prolonged sit-in by family members of the deceased policeman at Quetta's Koila Phatak and their refusal to bury the dead until authorities addressed the security failures indicates that something extraordinary had occurred.
Disturbing Revelations
Despite the Pakistan army’s complete clampdown on media reporting from Balochistan and frequent internet shutdowns, some disturbing facts related to the Mangi dam police out post attack have emerged. Though difficult to authenticate, these assertions help in filling gaps in ISPR’s version of this incident due to which they gain credibility
The first doubt is that when the policemen knew very well that BLA would eventually kill them, why did they surrender or allow the attackers to take them into custody, especially when they were giving the attackers a tough fight and inflicting heavy casualties on them?
It is now being revealed that police men at the Mangi dam outpost had resisted the attackers for 4-5 hours, but had no choice but to surrender after running out of ammunition. Insiders say that fearing weapons and ammunition reaching into the hands of Baloch fighters, maintaining minimal ammunition stocks and avoiding issue of heavy automatic weapons to the police is a common practice followed by the Pakistan army.
Just a week before this attack, 14 police men at an outpost in Balochistan’s port city Gwadar had been dismissed from service as armed men had “looted official weapons, ammunition and other government equipment, and fled without facing any resistance.” So, it’s quite likely that the Pakistan army may have scaled down weapons and ammunition holdings in police outposts as a precautionary measure to prevent recurrence.
Locals are also claiming that the police outpost made several frantic radio calls reporting that ammunition was running low and had even requested for immediate reinforcements. Unfortunately no assistance ever came, and this explains why the police men lost a fight they were winning that night due to non-availability of ammunition.
Then there's the question of why families of the deceased police men organised a sit-in and refused to bury the dead for nearly ten days demanding inquiry into “security failures” that led to the killings until the government agreed to form a judicial commission to probe this incident.”
Three issues that need to be investigated thoroughly are:
• One, what compelled the policemen at Mangi dam outpost to surrender to BLA fighters?
• Two, why did the Pakistan army fail to recover the dead bodies of the deceased police men forcing their family members to do so after waiting for more than 24 hours?
• Three, when Hong Kong based NgTeng Fong –Sino Group Belt and Road Research Institute had in its June 2026 report clearly mentioned that “we see a severe increase in attacks in July in the Balochistan region,” why weren’t security arrangements in the Mangi dam enhanced, especially since it was an isolated post located in a remote area?
The Balochistan Levies Question
It’s no secret that Pakistan’s police force in the restive areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan are both ill-equipped and ill-trained to fight armed groups. It’s also no secret that instead of overcoming these deficiencies, police men are being employed for tasks far beyond their capabilities.
While police are being made the whipping boy in Balochistan, no one is questioning the government’s October 2025 decision to merge the Balochistan Levies with the Balochistan police. For those who may not be aware, Balochistan Levies comprises locals and policed 90 percent of Balochistan and is rated higher for efficiency and reliability as compared to the police force that predominantly consists of non-locals.
The military doesn’t seem to like the Balochistan Levies. Why else was it disbanded both by President Pervez Musharraf and Field Marshal Asim Munir? While the Balochistan Assembly revived it in 2010, the ‘failed’ field marshal merged it with Balochistan Police in October last year.
Rawalpindi's dislike for Balochistan Levies is most probably due to the apprehension that being sons of the soil its rank and file cannot be fully relied upon when it comes to carrying out illegal tasks like enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings-the basic tools of Pakistan army’s operations in Balochistan.
Sham Inquiry?
Many feel that it would be naïve to expect that the judicial commission would specifically identify security lapses because doing so will expose the Pakistan army’s culpability as regards intelligence failure and not taking timely action to reinforce or assist the beleaguered outpost that led to the death of 27 police men. The army’s failure to recover dead bodies of the slain policemen too is unlikely to find mention in the inquiry commission report for obvious reasons.
Similarly, while yielding to public pressure after the Mangi dam outpost attack, the government has agreed to examine the public demand for restoration of Balochistan Levies, and this is a promising development. However, the associated problem is that should this happen, it would be yet another embarrassment for the Field Marshal Munir, which he cannot afford at this stage.
And this brings us to the million dollar question- who will bell the cat?
Nilesh Kunwar is a retired Indian Army Officer who has served in Jammu & Kashmir, Assam, Nagaland and Manipur. He is a keen ‘Kashmir-Watcher,’ and after retirement is pursuing his favourite hobby of writing for newspapers, journals and think-tanks. Views expressed above are the author's own
