Indian Defence News

Sunday, September 20, 2026

The trajectory of Indo-American relations has been dramatically altered within just 18 months of Donald Trump’s second term.

What once appeared to be a steady course correction since the early 2000s, bringing the world’s two largest democracies closer together, now risks sliding back to the frostiness of the 1990s, or even the hostility of the 1970s.

The passage of the Russia Sanctions Bill has become the defining moment in this reversal. The legislation empowers the US president to impose sanctions on Russia and levy tariffs of up to 100 per cent on countries continuing to buy Russian oil and gas.

For Delhi, this measure undermines the notion of a shared rules-based order, particularly when Washington’s rhetoric of partnership is contradicted by coercive economic instruments.

The bipartisan support for the Bill is striking. The Senate passed it on 7 August 2026 by 86 votes to 11, with overwhelming backing from both Republicans and Democrats. Only Rand Paul among Republicans opposed it, while Bernie Sanders stood as the sole Independent against it.

The House vote on 16 September 2026 was less one-sided but still decisive, with 262 members supporting and 159 opposing. The numbers reveal a growing consensus in Washington that Bharat should be treated not as a strategic partner but as a potential target of punitive measures.

This consensus strips away the diplomatic cover that once softened tensions. Even if a new president in 2029 adopts a more cautious tone, the structural frictions surrounding Bharat’s rise are unlikely to disappear. Delhi must therefore prepare for a prolonged period of strained relations with Washington.

The Bill’s structure raises questions about its true target. While ostensibly aimed at Moscow, its provisions disproportionately affect Bharat. China, Turkey and the European Union remain the largest buyers of Russian coal, crude oil, oil products, LNG and pipeline gas.

Yet exemptions in the legislation allow EU nations to escape sanctions by treating them as individual countries under a 15 per cent threshold. The US itself retains limited imports of Russian uranium for civilian nuclear cooperation. Bharat, however, faces the full brunt of punitive tariffs despite its energy needs for 1.4 billion people.

This asymmetry is difficult to ignore. Washington’s approach effectively asks Delhi to subordinate its energy requirements to American strategic priorities. The timing, coming soon after the Brics summit in Delhi, suggests an attempt to constrain Bharat’s independent foreign policy and push it towards American energy supplies.

The Modi government has so far adopted a cautious stance, avoiding outright confrontation. Yet caution risks being misread as weakness. The Trump administration appears to interpret Delhi’s restraint as acquiescence. Analysts argue that reciprocal measures, such as a tariff-for-tariff model inspired by Mark Carney’s approach, could signal that Bharat will not accept coercion without response.

Standing up to America would be challenging, given the Indian economy’s dependence on US markets and technology. However, long-term growth and sovereignty may require short-term pain. Diversification of energy supplies, trade relationships, defence partnerships and critical technologies is essential to reduce vulnerability to any single power.

The Indo-American romance, once celebrated as a partnership of democracies, now faces a harsh reality. What emerges may not be outright hostility but a colder, more transactional relationship based on interests and reciprocity.

The Russia Sanctions Bill may be framed as targeting Moscow, but Delhi must recognise that it is equally in the line of fire. The time has come for Bharat to convey clearly that business as usual is no longer acceptable.

This piece is loosely based on an article published by FirstPost, with due credit and courtesy to the original source

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The Indian Air Force has now acquired advanced deep penetration bunker busters, specifically designed to target Pakistan’s newly established Strategic Complex Defence centre and its Next‑Generation All‑Domain Command and Control Centre (NG‑ADC2C).

These developments mark a significant escalation in India’s counterforce capabilities, with the modified Agni‑V missile system being tailored for precision strikes against deeply buried infrastructure.

India’s acquisition of bunker busters follows the successful destruction of two of Pakistan Air Force’s prized Next Gen Mobile Mission Control Centres (NG‑MMCC) at Nur Khan air base.

That strike revealed vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s backup command‑and‑control infrastructure and demonstrated India’s ability to neutralise high‑value assets with precision. The new bunker busters are intended to extend this capability to hardened underground facilities.

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been modifying the Agni‑V missile to carry massive conventional warheads weighing around 7,500–8,000 kg. These warheads are designed to penetrate 80–100 metres underground, enabling India to destroy fortified bunkers, missile silos, and command centres.

The modified Agni‑V, though with reduced range compared to its nuclear‑armed variant, offers India a credible deep‑penetration strike option against Pakistan’s most secure installations.

Two types of warheads are under development. The first is an airburst warhead, intended to devastate above‑ground structures or entry points of underground facilities.

The second is a deep penetrator warhead, engineered to burrow into reinforced concrete and rock before detonation. This dual approach provides India with flexibility in targeting both surface and subterranean assets.

A simulated image of TEJAS fighter jet dropping a deep penetrator warhead

The NG‑ADC2C, Pakistan’s ambitious next‑generation command‑and‑control hub, was conceived to integrate air, land, sea, cyber, and space domains into a unified operational framework. Its destruction would cripple Pakistan’s ability to coordinate multi‑domain operations.

Similarly, the Strategic Complex Defence centre, believed to house critical nuclear and missile infrastructure, represents a cornerstone of Pakistan’s deterrence posture. India’s new capability directly threatens these assets.

Strategically, this development blurs the line between conventional and nuclear warfare. While India maintains its official No First Use (NFU) doctrine, the ability to strike nuclear‑related infrastructure with conventional bunker busters introduces ambiguity. Pakistan, unable to distinguish between conventional and nuclear payloads in the brief flight time of an incoming missile, may interpret such strikes as part of a nuclear first strike, raising the risk of escalation.

The precedent for such weapons comes from the United States’ use of Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs against Iranian nuclear facilities. India’s pursuit of similar capabilities reflects a doctrinal shift towards counterforce pre‑emption and decapitation strategies.

Analysts warn that this could destabilise South Asia’s fragile deterrence balance, as Pakistan may feel compelled to harden its Full Spectrum Deterrence posture further.

For India, however, the acquisition of bunker busters represents a leap in operational flexibility. It allows the IAF to target deeply buried assets without relying solely on nuclear options, thereby expanding its conventional strike envelope. This capability also signals to adversaries that India can neutralise critical infrastructure even under hardened protection.

The broader implication is that South Asia is entering a new phase of strategic competition, where advanced conventional weapons are increasingly intertwined with nuclear doctrines.

The next round of confrontation between India and Pakistan may therefore be defined not by traditional air campaigns, but by precision strikes against subterranean command centres.

Agencies

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India’s Zorawar light tank program, jointly developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Larsen & Toubro, is facing a delay of up to two years after the Army demanded protection levels beyond STANAG Level 4, as reported by Times of India.

This requirement has pushed the induction timeline from the original target of 2027 to possibly 2028 or 2029, as engineers work to strengthen armour while keeping the weight under the crucial 25‑ton limit needed for high‑altitude mobility in regions such as Ladakh.

STANAG protection levels, defined by NATO, measure how well armoured vehicles withstand battlefield threats including small arms fire, artillery fragments and mine blasts. Level 4 is designed to stop heavy machine‑gun fire and withstand mine blasts equivalent to 10 kg of TNT.

Levels above 4 offer markedly stronger protection: Level 5 resists 25 mm autocannon rounds, while Level 6 can defeat 30 mm armour‑piercing rounds and survive near‑direct 155 mm artillery hits. However, higher protection adds significant weight and cost, reducing mobility and limiting deployment in difficult terrain.

The Zorawar was conceived after China deployed Type‑15 light tanks during the 2020 standoff in eastern Ladakh. India plans to induct 354 units, with an initial batch of 59 to be produced by Larsen & Toubro at its Hazira plant. The tank was recently showcased to Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to Hazira, highlighting its importance to India’s defence modernisation efforts.

Developed in just 19 months, Zorawar is India’s first indigenous light tank optimised for Himalayan warfare. Named after General Zorawar Singh, the ‘Conqueror of Ladakh,’ it is lighter than China’s Type‑15 while maintaining comparable firepower.

The platform mounts a Belgian John Cockerill 3105 turret with a 105 mm autoloading gun, a coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun, a 12.7 mm remote‑controlled weapon station and twin launchers for Nag Mk‑2 anti‑tank guided missiles. It is powered by a Cummins 760 hp diesel engine paired with a Renk transmission, capable of speeds up to 70 km/h and a range of 450 km.

Its light weight enables airlift by aircraft such as the C‑390, which is being considered under the Indian Air Force’s Medium Transport Aircraft competition. Any increase above 25 tons would reduce the pool of transport aircraft able to carry the tank, restricting deployment to larger types such as the A‑400M, Il‑76 and C‑17.

During the 2020 Ladakh standoff, heavier tanks such as the T‑72 and T‑90 were airlifted using the IAF’s Il‑76s and C‑17s, underscoring the logistical challenges of deploying heavy armour in mountainous terrain.

The delay reflects the Army’s emphasis on survivability in modern combat environments, where threats from autocannons, anti‑tank guided missiles and drone swarms are increasingly prevalent.

While the extended timeline poses challenges, it also provides an opportunity for Indian developers to integrate advanced composite armour, modular protection systems and active defence technologies.

This ensures that Zorawar will remain a strategically viable platform for high‑altitude warfare and a credible counter to Chinese deployments in the Himalayas.

Agencies

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The collision between Indian and Pakistani naval vessels in the North Arabian Sea on 15 September 2026 has become the latest flashpoint in maritime tensions between the two countries.

The incident involved INS Kolkata, a Project 15A Kolkata-class guided missile destroyer of the Indian Navy, and PNS Hunain, an OPV 2600-class offshore patrol vessel of the Pakistan Navy.

According to India, the Pakistani ship executed a dangerous overtaking manoeuvre at high speed, resulting in the collision. Pakistan has rejected this account, alleging instead that the Indian warship carried out a provocative manoeuvre.

INS Kolkata is a 164-metre-long guided missile destroyer built by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders in Mumbai. It has a full-load displacement of about 7,400 tons and can sail at speeds of up to 30 knots.

Commissioned in August 2014, it is designed as a high-end surface combatant with long-range air-defence, anti-surface, and anti-submarine capabilities. The vessel is equipped to operate helicopters and carries the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile as its principal strike weapon.

PNS Hunain, designated F-273, is a 98-metre-long offshore patrol vessel built by Damen Shipyards in Romania and commissioned in July 2024. With a displacement of about 2,600 tons and a top speed of 24 knots, it is part of Pakistan’s OPV 2600 series, a follow-on to the Yarmook-class patrol ships.

Pakistan describes Hunain as a multi-purpose platform capable of maritime surveillance, patrol, and security missions, equipped with electronic-warfare systems, anti-ship and anti-air warfare capabilities, and terminal defence systems. It can also embark a multirole helicopter.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated that INS Kolkata was conducting routine surveillance when PNS Hunain approached at high speed and manoeuvred dangerously close. On 18 September, India rejected Pakistan’s diplomatic response and reiterated that the Pakistani vessel’s actions violated both the 1991 bilateral agreement and the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. India emphasised that INS Kolkata suffered no major damage and remains deployed at sea.

Pakistan, however, has maintained that the Indian warship carried out a provocative manoeuvre during the encounter. The precise sequence of movements immediately before the collision remains disputed. Pakistan has claimed that Hunain sustained damage and returned to harbour following the incident.

The 1991 Agreement between India and Pakistan on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements includes Article 10, which specifically addresses maritime safety.

It stipulates that naval ships and submarines of the two countries should not approach within three nautical miles of each other while operating in international waters, in order to avoid accidents. This provision, equivalent to about 5.6 kilometres, is a bilateral confidence-building measure rather than a universal maritime rule.

This is not the first time such an incident has occurred. In June 2011, Pakistani warship PNS Babur came dangerously close to Indian Navy frigate INS Godavari during anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, causing minor damage. India lodged a protest at the time, citing navigational safety violations under the same framework.

Following the latest collision, India summoned Pakistan’s Chargé d’Affaires in New Delhi and lodged a strong protest. Simultaneously, India’s Charge d’Affaires in Islamabad was instructed to raise the matter with Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry.

New Delhi has advised Pakistan to ensure that its military units exercise due care and comply with relevant bilateral agreements to prevent recurrence. India has stressed that the fact the collision occurred in international waters does not exempt the two navies from adhering to agreed rules of conduct.

The unresolved question remains the exact sequence of manoeuvres that brought the two vessels into close proximity. Analysts note that while INS Kolkata continues to operate at sea, the incident underscores the fragility of maritime interactions between India and Pakistan, where even routine deployments can escalate into diplomatic confrontations.

Agencies

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Analysing stealth technology on the Su-57 fighter jet reveals a distinctive divergence from American design philosophy, reported Vietnamese media.

Both are fifth-generation aircraft, yet Russia’s Su-57 Felon employs digital pixel camouflage patterns rather than the uniform grey paint schemes favoured by American fighters such as the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning-II. This choice is not merely aesthetic but deeply rooted in tactical doctrine and technological priorities.

Stealth begins with aerodynamic shaping, airframe construction, and radar-absorbing material systems. These coatings often incorporate compounds like iron carbonyl powder, which absorb radar waves and convert them into heat.

The challenge lies in managing this heat, as it risks increasing the aircraft’s infrared signature. To counter this, multi-layered molecular treatments are applied so that the heat dissipates gradually into the frame, preventing thermal hotspots visible to infrared sensors.

American fighters rely on a uniform grey finish, which originates from the natural colour of radar-absorbing materials. This scheme allows them to blend seamlessly into the sky under varying light conditions, complementing their doctrine of beyond-visual-range interception.

Equipped with AESA radar systems, they prioritise detecting adversaries at long range, launching missiles, and disengaging swiftly according to the first-sight principle.

The Su-57, however, adopts a pixelated camouflage pattern with jagged geometric shapes and multiple colour bands. This disrupts the optical outline of the aircraft, complicating visual identification during manoeuvres.

More importantly, it interferes with computer vision algorithms used by reconnaissance satellites and drones. By distorting identification patterns, the Su-57 reduces the likelihood of automatic tracking by artificial intelligence systems, adding a new dimension to stealth beyond radar evasion.

Russian doctrine anticipates that when opposing forces both field fifth-generation fighters, long-range stealth advantages may neutralise each other. As combat closes to within visual range, dogfighting becomes inevitable.

The Su-57’s camouflage, combined with radar-absorbing technology, ensures adaptability in both long-range and close-range engagements. This reflects Russia’s emphasis on manoeuvrability, situational awareness, and resilience in contested airspace.

The divergence in design philosophies underscores broader strategic differences. American fighters are optimised for precision strikes and rapid disengagement, while Russian planners prepare for prolonged engagements where deception and survivability are paramount. The Su-57’s pixel camouflage is thus not only a technological innovation but also a manifestation of Russia’s unique approach to air warfare.

Characteristic	American F-22, F-35 Jets	Russian Su-57 Fighter Jet
Surface colour	Uniform monochrome grey	Digital pixel art
Camouflage target	Blending into the sky, optimizing radar absorption.	Distorting shapes and deceiving AI's vision.
Tactical priorities	Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Air Combat	Combining long-range air combat and close-range dogfighting (WVR)

Agencies

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Lt Gen Rajiv Kumar Sahni, Director General of Electronics and Mechanical Engineers and Colonel Commandant of the Corps of EME, undertook a forward area visit to troops deployed in the Fire and Fury Corps sector along the Line of Actual Control.

His presence underscored the importance of technical readiness in sustaining operational effectiveness in one of the most demanding theatres of military deployment.

During the visit, he conducted a detailed review of the engineering support framework and assessed the operational preparedness of weapons and equipment held by Army units and formations. The inspection was comprehensive, covering the performance and reliability of systems critical to frontline operations.

The review placed particular emphasis on Next-Generation Vehicles, specialised equipment, unmanned aerial systems, and the robustness of maintenance and repair facilities. Integration of emerging technologies into the support ecosystem was also examined, reflecting the Army’s drive to modernise its technical backbone.

High-altitude areas present extreme terrain and climatic challenges, making reliable technical support indispensable. Equipment readiness in such conditions is not merely a matter of efficiency but of survival and sustained operational capability.

The Corps of EME plays a pivotal role in ensuring that frontline formations remain combat-ready despite these adversities.

Lt Gen Sahni interacted extensively with EME personnel during his visit. He encouraged them to uphold professional excellence, maintain mission readiness, and pursue innovative technical solutions tailored to the unique demands of the high-altitude battlefield.

His engagement highlighted the human dimension of technical preparedness, where skill, innovation and dedication are as vital as machinery.

The visit reinforced the message that technology, maintenance and technical preparedness are central to keeping frontline forces operationally ready. In some of the world’s most challenging environments, the synergy between advanced equipment and dedicated technical personnel remains the cornerstone of sustained military effectiveness.

Agencies

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The eastern Indian city of Kolkata is being considered for the deployment of the Kusha Air Defence System (ADS) between 2030 and 2032.

This timeline is closely linked to the geopolitical developments surrounding Bangladesh’s potential decision to join the Mecca Pact, a regional security framework that could reshape South Asian defence alignments.

If Dhaka formally accedes to the pact, India is expected to accelerate the induction of advanced counter-drone systems alongside the Kusha ADS in the eastern theatre, ensuring a robust defensive shield against emerging aerial threats.

If circumstances demand it, India could, as an interim measure, deploy its S-400 air defence system nearer to the Bangladesh border to deter any potential aggressive moves by the Bangladeshi army.

Project Kusha represents India’s most ambitious indigenous long-range surface-to-air missile program, designed to rival global systems such as Russia’s S-400. It incorporates three interceptor variants with ranges of approximately 150 km, 250 km, and 400 km, all capable of engaging stealth aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons at speeds exceeding Mach 5.

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), working in collaboration with Bharat Dynamics Limited and Solar Industries under the Development-cum-Production Partner model, has already completed fabrication of the M1 interceptor, with trials underway and induction planned for the late 2020s.

The choice of Kolkata as a deployment hub is strategic. The city’s proximity to Bangladesh and its location along the Bay of Bengal make it a critical node in India’s eastern air defence architecture.

Should Bangladesh join the Mecca Pact, India would be compelled to reinforce its eastern flank, not only to deter potential adversaries but also to reassure regional allies of its preparedness.

The deployment of counter-drone systems in tandem with the Kusha ADS would address the growing threat posed by unmanned aerial vehicles, which have become increasingly sophisticated and accessible to both state and non-state actors.

India’s counter-drone strategy is evolving rapidly, with indigenous Start-Ups and defence firms introducing interceptor drones, directed infrared countermeasure (DIRCM) systems, and electronic warfare modules.

These technologies are expected to be integrated into the layered defence grid around Kolkata, creating a multi-dimensional shield capable of neutralising both conventional and asymmetric threats. The synergy between missile defence and counter-drone operations will be crucial in safeguarding critical infrastructure, military installations, and urban centres in eastern India.

The geopolitical implications of Bangladesh’s potential accession to the Mecca Pact are significant. For India, it would necessitate a recalibration of defence postures along the eastern frontier, while also opening avenues for cooperative security arrangements.

The pact itself is seen as a mechanism to counterbalance shifting alliances in the Indo-Pacific, where instability and new alignments are reshaping the strategic landscape.

India’s proactive deployment of advanced systems like Kusha in Kolkata would signal its readiness to adapt to these changes and maintain deterrence.

Financially, the deployment of such systems represents investments running into thousands of crores. Each interceptor unit, depending on its range and configuration, is estimated to cost between ₹1,200 crores and ₹1,800 crores, while counter-drone systems range from ₹50 Lakhs for portable units to ₹200 crores for integrated platforms.

The government’s emphasis on indigenous production ensures that these investments will also bolster India’s defence industrial base, creating opportunities for private sector participation and technological innovation.

The integration of artificial intelligence, advanced sensors, and electronic warfare capabilities into both the Kusha ADS and counter-drone systems reflects the broader transformation underway in India’s defence ecosystem.

DRDO laboratories, defence public sector undertakings, private industries, Start-Ups, MSMEs, and academia are collaborating more closely than ever before, accelerating the journey from innovation to operational capability. This collaborative model is expected to ensure timely deployment in Kolkata, aligning with the projected 2030–32 timeline.

The deployment of Kusha ADS in Kolkata, contingent upon Bangladesh’s decision regarding the Mecca Pact, underscores the intersection of geopolitics, technology, and regional security.

It highlights India’s determination to build an impenetrable air defence shield while simultaneously addressing the evolving threat of drones.

For the people of Kolkata and the broader eastern region, it promises a protective umbrella that will stand as a symbol of resilience and deterrence in an era of global uncertainty.

Agencies

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Ikran Aerospace’s Sirin-A1 is an advanced weapon-integrated unmanned aerial aircraft unveiled in 2025, designed for modular payloads including assault rifles, mortars, and surveillance systems. It represents India’s growing indigenous combat UAV capability, with ongoing trials and potential deployment by the Indian Armed Forces.

The Sirin-A1 was introduced by Pune-based Ikran Aerospace and Technologies Pvt Ltd in February 2025. It is a rotorcraft-style UAV with a maximum take-off weight of 40 kg and payload capacity of 10 kg. Depending on configuration, it can remain airborne for 15–30 minutes, with a range of 2–5 km and a service ceiling of 3,000 metres. This endurance allows it to perform short-range tactical missions, including direct combat support and reconnaissance.

Trials was conducted to showcase the combat drone to the armed forces in Jalandhar to evaluate its suitability for operational deployment.

The UAV is notable for its ability to integrate firearms such as the AK-47 and AK-203, mounted under the fuselage with stabilisation systems. Operators can remotely acquire targets and fire using indigenous software developed for precise control. This makes the Sirin-A1 one of the first Indian UAVs capable of direct kinetic engagement.

Beyond rifles, the Sirin-A1 can carry modular payloads including grenade-dropping systems, mortar launchers, and surveillance packages. Its camera suite includes night vision, 30x optical zoom, and laser pointers, supported by artificial intelligence algorithms for object recognition. This enables the UAV to switch seamlessly between combat and reconnaissance roles.

The system was showcased at Aero India 2025 in Bangalore, where Ikran Aerospace confirmed ongoing discussions with the Indian Air Force.

The UAV is led by retired Army veteran Captain Vidul Kelshikar, whose leadership has ensured the platform’s military relevance.

The Sirin-A1 is part of a broader push by India to indigenise advanced combat UAVs. Its modular design reflects global trends in drone warfare, where adaptability and payload flexibility are critical. The platform’s ability to integrate stabilised targeting, secure communications, and intelligent flight control systems positions it as a potential force multiplier for India’s armed forces.

Financially, the UAV is expected to be priced competitively compared to imported systems. While official figures are not disclosed, industry estimates suggest that each unit could cost in the range of ₹1.5–2 crores depending on payload configuration. This makes it a relatively affordable option for tactical missions compared to larger UAVs such as the Heron or Predator.

Operationally, the Sirin-A1 could be deployed for border surveillance, counter-insurgency, and urban warfare scenarios. Its short endurance limits strategic applications, but its rapid deployment and modular payloads make it highly effective for tactical engagements. The integration of AI-driven recognition systems also enhances situational awareness, reducing operator workload.

In conclusion, the Sirin-A1 represents a significant step in India’s indigenous UAV development, combining affordability, modularity, and combat capability. If adopted by the Indian Air Force, it could serve as a versatile platform for both offensive and surveillance missions, strengthening India’s tactical drone ecosystem.

Agencies

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Russia and India are attempting to move their decades-old defence relationship beyond the traditional buyer-and-seller model. The proposed modernisation of the BrahMos missile, the possible upgrade of India’s Su-30MKI fleet and Moscow’s offer to share Su-57 fighter-jet technology are emerging as important tests of this ambition.

The two countries are exploring a partnership centred on joint production, technology transfer, industrial localisation and the possible development of weapons for export markets. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently met in New Delhi ahead of the BRICS summit.

Their handshake and warm public interaction were described by Indian Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal as evidence of an “ever-strengthening relationship”.

However, the more important developments are taking place behind the diplomatic symbolism.

Officials and analysts believe that New Delhi and Moscow are considering a broader defence-industrial framework that could give Indian companies a greater role in designing, manufacturing and upgrading advanced military systems. This would represent an important change in the character of the relationship. For several decades, India was one of Russia’s largest defence customers.

Indian armed forces acquired Russian-origin tanks, fighter aircraft, submarines, helicopters, air-defence systems, missiles and other military equipment. The relationship also developed into licensed production and industrial cooperation. Yet India’s defence procurement policy has changed considerably in recent years.

New Delhi has increased purchases from the United States, France, Israel and other partners to obtain advanced technologies and reduce its dependence on a single supplier. The war in Ukraine has added further uncertainty. Western sanctions imposed on Russia since 2022 have restricted Moscow’s access to several advanced components, microelectronics, machine tools and other technologies.

These restrictions have created concerns about the availability of spares, supply-chain stability and the timely delivery of equipment to India. They have also encouraged both sides to reconsider the traditional arms-sale model. Instead of focusing only on the purchase of completed systems, India and Russia are now discussing joint production, technology transfer, domestic manufacturing and long-term industrial cooperation.

The approach is closely connected with India’s Make in India policy, introduced in 2014 to expand domestic manufacturing and reduce reliance on imported defence equipment. The BrahMos missile is the clearest example of what this model can achieve. BrahMos is a Russian-Indian joint venture that has developed and produced a supersonic cruise missile for land, naval and air-launched operations.

The missile can reportedly travel at around three times the speed of sound. It can be launched from land-based platforms, surface warships, submarines and aircraft. This multi-platform flexibility has helped BrahMos secure a distinctive position in the international defence market. The missile has also become one of the most visible examples of successful India-Russia defence cooperation.

Unlike a conventional imported weapon, BrahMos has involved joint development, Indian manufacturing, local integration and the gradual expansion of India’s industrial role. The system has been inducted by the Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force. An export version has also been developed, with the Philippines becoming the first foreign customer for the land-based BrahMos coastal-defence system.

The missile’s export success has strengthened the argument that India and Russia can jointly develop equipment not only for their own armed forces but also for international customers. The next challenge is to determine whether the same model can be applied to more advanced systems. Russian officials have indicated that the next-generation BrahMos should offer improved performance, additional capabilities and greater competitiveness in the international market.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the two countries were already jointly producing BrahMos missiles and should now consider improving their characteristics. He suggested that the missile could receive additional features to make it more effective and attractive to potential customers.

Indian analysts believe that the next stage should involve moving from the joint production of an existing weapon to the joint development of a new generation of weapons. This would require deeper cooperation in propulsion, guidance systems, sensors, warhead technology, materials, software and manufacturing processes.

One proposal involves developing a lighter and smaller BrahMos variant for India’s TEJAS fighter aircraft. The existing missile is powerful but heavy, and its size places limitations on the number of aircraft that can carry it. A reduced-size version could potentially be integrated with lighter fighter aircraft while preserving a significant portion of the missile’s range and precision-strike capability.

Such a weapon could give the Indian Air Force a long-range anti-ship and land-attack capability without relying exclusively on larger heavy fighters. Another proposal concerns a submarine-launched BrahMos variant. A submarine-compatible version would provide India with an additional sea-based strike option.

It could potentially be deployed from future attack submarines or other suitable underwater platforms, subject to technical, weight and launch-system requirements. A submarine-launched missile would improve the survivability of India’s maritime strike capability because submarines can remain concealed for extended periods.

The most ambitious proposal is a hypersonic BrahMos variant. The proposed system is expected to target speeds of around Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. A hypersonic missile would create major technical challenges in propulsion, thermal management, navigation, communications and terminal guidance. At hypersonic speeds, the missile’s outer surface experiences extreme heating. Its guidance system must also operate in a highly dynamic environment while maintaining accuracy against moving or defended targets.

Even if the final system does not immediately achieve every proposed performance figure, research and development in this area could strengthen the technological foundations of both countries. The development of an advanced BrahMos could also create opportunities for Indian aerospace, electronics, propulsion and precision-engineering companies. For Moscow, deeper BrahMos cooperation would help preserve its position in the Indian defence market while creating opportunities for future exports.

For New Delhi, it could support the development of a more self-reliant missile industry. The BrahMos project therefore has significance beyond the missile itself. It is being viewed as a possible foundation for a much broader India-Russia defence-industrial partnership. The other major area of cooperation is India’s Su-30MKI fleet. The Su-30MKI remains the backbone of the Indian Air Force’s combat-fighter inventory.

India operates a large fleet of the aircraft, many of which were assembled or manufactured domestically by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited under licence. The aircraft has received several Indian modifications over the years, including the integration of indigenous avionics, electronic-warfare equipment, communication systems and weapons. Russia and India are now discussing a large-scale upgrade of the fleet.

The proposed Super Sukhoi modernisation is estimated to be worth around $11 billion. Using the approximate conversion of $1 = ₹85, the figure is equivalent to about ₹93,500 crore. The package could cover nearly 260 aircraft. The proposed upgrades are expected to include new active electronically scanned array radars, modern avionics, improved electronic-warfare systems, enhanced communications and upgraded weapons.

Russia has also offered its Izdeliye 177S engine as a possible option for the modernised aircraft. The engine proposal is intended to provide improved thrust, lower fuel consumption and a longer service life, although the final decision would depend on technical evaluations, cost negotiations and the terms of technology transfer.

The modernisation would allow India to extend the operational life of the Su-30MKI fleet. It could also improve the aircraft’s ability to detect, track and engage targets in contested airspace. The upgraded fighters could receive better long-range air-to-air missiles, precision-guided weapons and enhanced network-centric warfare capabilities.

However, the program would be complex.

Modernising a large fleet of aircraft involves extensive testing, structural inspections, software integration, certification and changes to maintenance infrastructure. The Indian Air Force would also have to balance the cost of the upgrade against the purchase of new fighter aircraft. The Super Sukhoi initiative is therefore not simply an equipment upgrade. It could become a major industrial project involving HAL, Indian defence laboratories, private-sector suppliers and Russian aerospace companies.

The third and most politically sensitive proposal concerns the Su-57. Russia has proposed supplying India with its fifth-generation stealth fighter and has also discussed joint production in India. Moscow’s offer is intended to go beyond the sale of completed aircraft. It reportedly includes technology transfer, greater local manufacturing and the possibility of allowing Indian industry to produce significant portions of the aircraft. Russian officials have repeatedly described the proposal as flexible and attractive to India.

The discussions are particularly important because India is developing its own fifth-generation fighter, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, or AMCA. India’s AMCA project is intended to provide a domestically designed stealth fighter for the Indian Air Force. However, the development of a suitable high-performance aircraft engine remains one of the programme’s most difficult challenges.

India has considerable experience in aircraft design, assembly, avionics and systems integration, but it does not yet possess an operational indigenous fighter engine in the required thrust class.

This has created a major technological gap. Russia is attempting to position the Su-57 offer as a possible solution to India’s immediate need for a fifth-generation combat aircraft. The proposal could involve the direct acquisition of Su-57 aircraft, followed by phased local production. Reports have also suggested that Russia may be willing to share technology connected with the fighter’s engine. Some proposals have included local manufacturing of significant engine components, although the exact scope of any transfer would depend on a formal agreement. Moscow has reportedly indicated that discussions could cover other sensitive areas, including aircraft systems, radar technology, electronic warfare, low-observable features, software and air-launched weapons.

The extent of such access remains unclear.

Technology transfer involving a fifth-generation fighter is highly sensitive because it includes manufacturing knowledge accumulated over decades. It also involves proprietary information related to propulsion, radar-absorbent materials, flight-control software, sensors, electronic warfare and weapons integration. The Russian offer is therefore likely to be assessed not only on the aircraft’s operational performance but also on the depth and enforceability of the proposed technology transfer.

For India, local production would have several potential advantages. It could support the rapid creation of a domestic fifth-generation fighter manufacturing ecosystem. It could provide Indian engineers and manufacturers with experience in stealth shaping, low-observable materials, advanced avionics and integrated electronic warfare. It could also help expand the capabilities of HAL and Indian private-sector defence companies. A local production arrangement could reduce dependence on imported aircraft and simplify future maintenance, repair and overhaul activities. It might also provide a bridge capability while India continues work on the AMCA.

However, the Su-57 proposal also presents important risks. India would need to assess the aircraft’s operational maturity, availability, maintenance requirements and compatibility with its existing weapons and communications networks. The Indian Air Force would also have to examine whether acquiring a foreign fifth-generation fighter could affect the development schedule and funding of the AMCA. There is a possibility that a foreign aircraft could provide a short-term capability while also diverting financial and technical resources from India’s indigenous fighter project.

The issue of engines would be central to any agreement. India would need to determine whether Russia is offering genuine design and manufacturing access or only limited maintenance-level support. The distinction is critical. The ability to assemble an engine from imported modules is not the same as acquiring the capability to design, manufacture, test and improve the engine independently. India would also need guarantees concerning spare parts, repair facilities, software access, upgrades and long-term availability. The war in Ukraine has made these issues more important.

Sanctions and supply-chain disruptions have demonstrated how geopolitical developments can affect defence equipment availability. Any future agreement would need to contain arrangements for localised production and reliable access to critical components. It would also need to clarify how Indian-made aircraft and weapons could be exported to third countries.

For New Delhi, the priority will be to obtain genuine technological capability rather than merely purchase another foreign platform. For Moscow, the priority will be to demonstrate that it can provide dependable supplies, meaningful technology transfer and competitive systems despite the constraints created by sanctions.

BrahMos and the Su-57 have consequently become symbols of a much larger question.

They will help determine whether India and Russia can elevate their defence relationship from arms sales to a durable, technology-led partnership.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)

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Army Chief General Dhiraj Seth has successfully concluded his three-day official visit to Russia, marking another significant chapter in India–Russia defence cooperation. The visit, which ended on Friday, was characterised by high-level engagements with senior Russian military leadership and visits to key military institutions.

The interactions provided fresh impetus to bilateral defence ties, with discussions centred on capability development, training exchanges, artillery modernisation and the sharing of operational experience.

These themes reflect the evolving nature of India–Russia military cooperation, which has steadily expanded beyond traditional equipment procurement.

The timing of General Seth’s visit was notable, coming just days after Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in New Delhi. Their discussions covered a wide spectrum of bilateral cooperation, including defence, energy, space, political and economic sectors, thereby setting the strategic backdrop for the Army Chief’s engagements.

In Moscow, General Seth held talks with General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation. Their discussions focused on joint capability development, professional military exchanges and avenues for expanding military-to-military engagement. These talks underscored the importance of institutionalised cooperation between the two armies.

At the headquarters of the Russian Land Forces, General Seth exchanged perspectives on contemporary military developments. He discussed measures to deepen cooperation in training, capability development and professional experience sharing, highlighting the operational-level synergy between the two sides.

During his visit to St Petersburg, General Seth toured the Mikhailovskaya Military Artillery Academy. He interacted with its faculty on training methodologies and artillery modernisation, reflecting India’s interest in Russia’s advanced artillery systems. In a symbolic gesture, he was accorded the unique honour of firing the traditional cannon at the historic Peter and Paul Fortress, a ceremonial act steeped in Russian military tradition.

In Moscow, General Seth received a ceremonial Guard of Honour and paid homage at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, a national war memorial dedicated to Soviet soldiers who perished during World War II. This solemn tribute reinforced the shared respect for military sacrifice and tradition.

The visit reinforced the enduring trust between India and Russia, underlining their shared commitment to sustained military diplomacy, institutional exchanges and mutually beneficial professional cooperation. It also highlighted the broadening scope of defence ties, which now encompass joint production and technology cooperation, exemplified by the BrahMos missile project.

India and Russia continue to conduct regular military exercises, notably the Indra series, which has been a fixture of bilateral defence cooperation since 2003. These exercises provide practical platforms for interoperability and joint operational training.

Russia remains India’s largest defence supplier, accounting for 40 per cent of India’s arms imports between 2021 and 2025, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. This statistic underscores the depth of the defence relationship and Russia’s pivotal role in India’s military modernisation.

General Seth’s visit has therefore not only reaffirmed the historical foundations of India–Russia defence ties but also injected fresh momentum into their future trajectory, particularly in areas of joint capability development and advanced technology cooperation.

Agencies

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US drone maker Powerus has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Pakistan Army that includes an initial order for unmanned aerial systems, though the models, quantity and value remain undisclosed.

The deal is notable because Powerus is preparing to merge with Aureus Greenway Holdings, a company backed by Donald Trump Jr. and Eric Trump through American Ventures, with the Trump family described as passive investors.

Powerus, a US-based drone company, has entered into a formal agreement with the Pakistan Army. The memorandum of understanding includes an initial order for unmanned aerial systems. However, the company has not disclosed the specific drone models, the number of units, or the financial value of the order, citing security and confidentiality concerns.

The agreement was signed following a meeting between a Powerus delegation led by co-founder Brett Velicovich and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Forces, Field Marshal Asim Munir, at General Headquarters in Rawalpindi on 16 September. Pakistan’s military confirmed that discussions covered defence procurement, production, and long-term capacity building.

Powerus has indicated that it is exploring opportunities for technology cooperation with Pakistan. This includes the potential for building systems locally, which could contribute to Pakistan’s defence industrial base. The company’s executives have described the longer-term objective as establishing joint ventures that could eventually localise manufacturing in Pakistan.

The deal comes at a time when Pakistan is seeking to deepen defence and economic engagement with the United States, even as it remains heavily reliant on China for military hardware. Analysts have noted that the agreement reflects warming ties between Washington and Islamabad after years of strained relations.

Powerus itself is a relatively new company, incorporated in 2025 under the trading name Autonomous Power Corporation. It specialises in autonomous systems for defence and critical infrastructure, including heavy-lift drones, tactical UAVs, and autonomous maritime vessels. Its public product line includes the Guardian counter-drone system and the Guardian‑1 interceptor.

The agreement has drawn attention because Powerus is set to merge with Aureus Greenway Holdings, a Nasdaq-listed company backed by Donald Trump Jr. and Eric Trump through American Ventures. Regulatory filings indicate that American Ventures is expected to hold a 9.9 per cent beneficial ownership stake in the combined company after the merger. Both Powerus and Aureus Greenway Holdings have emphasised that the Trump family’s role is limited to passive investment, with no operational involvement in Powerus.

Donald Trump Jr.’s spokesperson has clarified that he has no involvement whatsoever in the management or operations of Powerus and plays no role in the procurement of contracts either in the United States or abroad. Powerus executives have also dismissed suggestions that the company’s growth is linked to the Trump family’s involvement, stressing that contracts are awarded on merit.

For now, the confirmed element of the Pakistan Army’s acquisition is the initial order for unmanned aerial systems. The scale, capability, and operational role of these systems remain unclear. The broader framework of cooperation, however, suggests that Powerus and Pakistan may pursue deeper collaboration in defence technology and production in the future.

Agencies

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Senior Houthi govt official threatens targeting Pakistani regime with ballistic missiles strikes in Karachi, if Pak carries out military ops against the group to aid Saudis.

Yemen’s Houthis have escalated their rhetoric, warning Pakistan and Turkey that any military deployment in support of Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement would be met with retaliation ‘with an iron fist’. This comes amid fresh Houthi missile and drone strikes on Riyadh, intensifying the regional crisis.

The Houthis issued their warning through senior official Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti in an interview with CNN-News18. He stated that if Pakistani or Turkish forces joined Saudi-led operations, Yemen would respond with severe and immediate military retaliation.

He emphasised that Yemen’s posture remains defensive against Saudi-led military campaigns and economic blockades, but any foreign intervention would be treated as direct aggression.

Al-Bukhaiti drew parallels to previous Houthi strikes against Western naval assets and regional targets, stressing that Yemen would “discipline” any foreign power entering the conflict. He insisted that the Yemeni movement would strike back decisively, invoking the phrase “iron fist” to underline the severity of their response.

The warning followed public statements by Pakistani defence officials regarding the possible activation of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. Signed in August 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey, the pact stipulates that an attack on one signatory is considered an attack on all.

This collective deterrence framework has raised speculation about foreign troop deployments, particularly Pakistani and Turkish forces, into Saudi territory or Yemeni conflict zones.

The Houthis also claimed that the majority of the public in Turkey and Pakistan sympathises with the humanitarian plight of Yemen’s population. They urged both governments to remain neutral and avoid acting as military proxies for Riyadh. The official demanded that Islamabad and Ankara “keep to themselves” rather than escalate the conflict by siding militarily with Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan and Turkey are currently balancing their diplomatic commitments with Saudi Arabia against regional sensitivities. Islamabad has dispatched a high-level delegation to Iran to seek de-escalation, signalling that it is attempting to avoid being drawn directly into the Yemeni theatre. Turkish officials, meanwhile, have maintained close coordination with Riyadh but face domestic pressures over foreign military entanglements.

The Houthi warning coincided with a sharp escalation in hostilities. On 19 September 2026, flames and smoke were seen near Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport after Houthi missile and drone attacks targeted “Sensitive” sites, including an Aramco facility in Yanbu. Saudi air defences intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at the capital, but the attacks underscored the Houthis’ capacity to strike deep inside Saudi territory.

The United Nations Security Council has condemned the continued Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, warning of risks to civilian and energy infrastructure.

The escalation threatens global oil supplies, with Red Sea shipping routes already under strain due to the ongoing US–Iran war. Pakistan’s warning to Iran earlier this month to rein in the Houthis highlights the seriousness of the crisis and the risk of a proxy war spiralling into a broader regional conflict.

The Houthis’ latest statement is therefore both a deterrent and a political manoeuvre. By invoking public sympathy in Turkey and Pakistan, they aim to pressure both governments into avoiding military deployments. At the same time, their strikes on Saudi infrastructure demonstrate their willingness to escalate if foreign forces intervene.

Agencies

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National Security Adviser Ajit Doval has recounted a harrowing episode from his early career, describing the moment when operatives sent across the border were captured and held in Chinese custody. Speaking at the convocation ceremony of IIT-Roorkee, he admitted that at the time he feared the incident would mark the end of his professional journey.

Doval explained that the group of operatives had been dispatched across the frontier but failed to return within the expected timeframe. Days passed without any communication, and there were no reports of avalanches or other natural incidents that could explain their disappearance. The silence deepened his concern.

He recalled receiving a telephone call from headquarters, where his superior asked if he had sent men across. Doval replied that they should have returned within five or six days, but it had already been ten or eleven. His superior then informed him that the operatives were in Chinese custody.

According to Doval, the agents had been captured and interrogated by Chinese authorities. Eventually, they were returned, but only after what he believed must have been negotiations or a deal. He described them as shattered and in shambles upon their release.

The incident triggered an official inquiry. Doval admitted that he believed his career was finished, as he was still in his twenties and considered the episode unprofessional.

He feared he would have to start anew. However, the inquiry concluded that he was not at fault. The responsibility lay with defects in the sketches and maps provided by headquarters, which contained mistakes that had led to the mishap.

Reflecting on the episode decades later, Doval used the occasion to highlight the opportunities available to today’s youth. He told the graduating students of IIT-Roorkee that they were the luckiest generation in the last thousand years, as they were entering an era of unprecedented possibilities.

He contrasted their situation with earlier generations who struggled under slavery and lacked such opportunities. He emphasised that technology would be the most important driver of growth and progress for countries and societies in the future.

Doval urged the students to recognise the transformative power of technological advancement, stressing that they were entering a period where innovation and science would shape the destiny of nations. His remarks combined a personal recollection of vulnerability with a broader message of optimism for the younger generation.

Agencies

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by Col (Dr.) P K Vasudeva

The 18th Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) countries Summit was held in New Delhi on 12–13 September 2026 under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister Modi who announced the BRICS theme “building for resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability.”

India deserves considerable credit for facilitating consensus among BRICS members on the Leaders’ Declaration. Members adopted the New Delhi Declaration, covering economic, technological, security and global-governance issues. Hats off to Modi.

BRICS countries include several of the world's major energy producers and consumers. Their cooperation can therefore have significant implications for energy, security, economic development, emissions reduction and access to clean energy. At the same time, members have different energy mixes, economic structures and development priorities, so the transition involves balancing environmental objectives with affordability and reliable energy supply.

India used its Chairmanship to promote cooperation in:

• Digital public infrastructure
• AI and emerging technologies
• Health and mental well-being
• Clean energy and sustainable development
• Agriculture and food security
• MSMEs and skill development

Digital Public Infrastructure

India has proposed a Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) repository, capacity-building centre, and voluntary pilot projects for BRICS nations. Key details on DPI are:

• Core Model: India promotes its population-scales systems - such as Aadhar (identity), UPI (payments) and Digi Locker (verifiable) documents - as a blueprint for developing economies.
• Collaboration: At the BRICS ICT Track, officials emphasised open-source, interoperable technologies to reduce financial exclusion and improve public service delivery.
• Global Strategy: The initiative positions India’s inclusive digital framework as an alternative approach for the Global South with the expanded BRICS alliance.

AI And Emerging Technologies

Artificial Intelligence (AI) emerged as a major priority at the summit . BRICS called for AI that is inclusive, trustworthy, safe, sustainable and accessible to developing countries. India pushed initiatives relating to digital public infrastructure and technological cooperation. Leaders placed the technology at the heart of BRICS to drive inclusive growth and cooperation.

BRICS countries also highlighted the importance of using AI for economic growth and social good, while promoting the energy efficiency of AI systems. Such cooperation would be essential for building a just, fair, equitable and prosperous future of all countries.

Health And Mental Well-Being

BRICS health cooperation centres on building resilient health care systems, launching a joint infectious disease early warning system and expanding traditional medicines integration as heightened in September 2026. BRICS strengthened cooperation on public health, mental health and non-communicable diseases. NIMHANS, Bengaluru, was designated as the coordinating institution for the BRICS network of Centres of Excellence on mental health.

Clean Energy And Sustainable Development

BRICS nations advance clean energy and sustainable development by prioritising green technology manufacturing, critical mineral value chains, and equitable energy transitions, as heightened in the BRICS Declaration.

BRICS cooperation on clean energy and sustainable development focuses on expanding renewable energy, improving energy efficiency, supporting climate resilient development, and facilitating technology and investment among member countries. Key areas of clean energy are:

• Promoting solar, wind, hydropower, bioenergy and other low-carbon energy sources.
• Reducing dependence on high-carbon energy while considering energy security and the development needs of member countries.
• Encouraging cooperation in areas such as energy storage, smart grids, electric mobility and clean-energy technologies.
• Supporting environmentally sustainable transport, cities, buildings and industrial systems.
• Strengthening cooperation on climate-change mitigation and adaptation in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement.
• Mobilising public and private investment for renewable-energy and sustainable-development projects.
• Exchanging research, technologies, expertise and policy experiences between BRICS countries.

The summit emphasised climate finance, adaptation, disaster resilience and sustainable development. It recognised the different circumstances and development needs of developing countries. The Declaration emphasised urgent multilateral climate action, equitable climate finance, and strong opposition to unilateral trade barriers like carbon border taxes.

The focus comes against the backdrop of Nepal floods that struck only weeks earlier and killed nearly 1400 people, underscoring how climate shocks are no longer a distant policy concern but a direct threat to lives, infrastructure and growth. For emerging economies, the declaration’s emphasised on adaptation and also a reminder that the financing gap remains one of the biggest obstacle to climate action.

Agriculture And Food Security

BRICS cooperation in agriculture and food security aims to improve agricultural productivity, ensure stable food supplies, support farmers, and strengthen sustainable and resilient food systems. Key areas are:

• Promoting reliable access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food for populations across member countries.
• Sharing technologies, research and best practices to increase crop and livestock productivity.
• Encouraging efficient use of soil, water and other natural resources while reducing environmental impacts.
• Developing agricultural practices that can withstand droughts, floods, heat and other effects of climate change.
• Cooperation in areas such as digital agriculture, precision farming, improved seeds, irrigation and agricultural machinery.
• Facilitating agricultural trade and cooperation among BRICS countries to strengthen food supply chains.
• Sharing scientific research, expertise and information on crops, livestock, fisheries and food production.
• Improving access to markets, technology, finance and agricultural knowledge, particularly for small and family farmers.
• Improving storage, transportation and processing to reduce losses after harvesting.

BRICS countries have large agricultural sectors and represent a significant share of the world's population and food production. Cooperation can help address common challenges such as climate change, water scarcity, volatile food prices, supply-chain disruptions and rural poverty.

India has emphasized areas such as millets, sustainable agriculture, digital agricultural technologies, climate-resilient farming and food security in BRICS cooperation. India's experience with diverse agricultural systems also provides opportunities for knowledge sharing with other member countries.

MSMEs And Skill Development

BRICS cooperation on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and skill development focuses on promoting entrepreneurship, employment, innovation and inclusive economic growth. The key areas are:

• Improving MSMEs' access to credit, investment and other financial services.
• Helping small businesses enter domestic, BRICS and international markets.
• Encouraging MSMEs to adopt e-commerce, digital payments, AI and other new technologies.
• Promoting research, entrepreneurship and technology-based businesses.
• Supporting greater participation of women and young people in business.
• Facilitating partnerships and exchange of knowledge among MSMEs in BRICS countries.
• Helping small enterprises participate in regional and global value chains.
• Strengthening technical and vocational education and training (TVET).
• Developing skills that match changing labour-market and industry requirements.
• Promoting training in areas such as information technology, AI, automation and digital services.
• Encouraging business management, financial literacy and innovation.
• Improving employability and creating pathways from education to decent work.
• BRICS countries can share successful models of vocational training and workforce development.
• Greater cooperation can help improve comparability and recognition of qualifications across countries.

BRICS National Currency

BRICS supported greater use of national currencies in cross-border trade and investment. The focus was on making cross-border payments faster, cheaper and safer through interoperability of national payment systems. Importantly, no common BRICS currency was announced. The New Development Bank was encouraged to expand local-currency financing.

The declaration raised concerns about unilateral tariffs, non-tariff barriers and coercive economic measures that distort international trade. This has particular significance in the context of US tariff and sanctions policies.

The BRICS focused on strengthening economic cooperation among member countries and reducing dependence on the US dollar in international trade. BRICS countries emphasized developing alternative mechanisms for cross-border payments. Greater use of members’ national currencies, including the Indian rupee, Chinese yuan and Russian rubble, could facilitate trade and reduce dependence on the US dollar.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has proposed greater interoperability and linking of digital currencies to make cross-border payments, including those related to tourism, faster and easier. BRICS members will gradually explore ways to reduce their reliance on the US dollar by promoting trade in national currencies and developing alternative payment arrangements.

The BRICS marked a gradual shift towards a more multipolar global order through local-currency trade, alternative payment mechanisms, reform of global institutions, stronger counter-terrorism cooperation and greater representation of the Global South, while emphasising dialogue and diplomacy in international conflicts.

Cross Border Terrorism

BRICS strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms. The declaration specifically condemned the Pahalgam terrorist attack and emphasised zero tolerance towards terrorism, terrorist financing and safe havens. It called for stronger international cooperation against terrorism.

BRICS strongly emphasised the need to eliminate cross-border terrorism and called for greater international cooperation against terrorism. The summit reaffirmed that war is not a solution to international disputes and stressed the importance of dialogue, diplomacy and peaceful negotiations.

BRICS stressed that international conflicts should be resolved through dialogue, consultation and diplomacy, rather than unilateral military action. On the West Asian crisis, the grouping called for maximum restraint and expressed concern over the escalation of violence.

BRICS called for greater representation of the Global South in international institutions. It supported reform of the UN and UN Security Council to make global governance more representative and responsive to contemporary realities.

India - Russian Talks

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a bilateral meeting on 11 September 2026, on the sidelines of the 18th BRICS Summit. The meeting lasted about 45 minutes.

Modi–Putin talks reviewed cooperation across politics, trade and economy, defence, energy, space, skill mobility and people-to-people ties. Both agreed to keep strengthening the bilateral “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.”

They welcomed the first INNOPROM India industrial exhibition, held in New Delhi from 9–11 September, as a vehicle for expanding trade and industrial cooperation. Ahead of the meeting, Indian officials indicated that discussions were expected to cover civil nuclear energy, fertilisers, defence, critical minerals, manufacturing, railways and steel.

Modi reiterated India's position that dialogue and diplomacy are the way forward for resolving conflicts. The leaders also discussed the Black Sea and West Asia conflicts, particularly their effects on maritime trade and the safety of Indian seafarers. They discussed India–Russia cooperation within BRICS under India's 2026 chairmanship, along with regional and global issues of mutual interest.

Putin invited Modi to Russia for the 24th India–Russia Annual Summit. Modi accepted; the date will be decided through diplomatic channels.

After the BRICS meetings, the Kremlin said that Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping told Putin they were prepared to help bring the Ukraine conflict to an end. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Putin reacted positively and that Russia was open to countries using their influence to encourage Kyiv toward greater flexibility.

The meeting therefore combined practical India–Russia cooperation—especially trade, energy, defence and industrial ties—with discussions of Ukraine, West Asia, maritime security and BRICS coordination.

If you want, I can also give you (1) what India and Russia actually agreed to, (2) the defence/oil trade implications, or (3) a detailed Modi–Putin–Xi BRICS meeting timeline.

India and Russia actually agreed to areas of cooperation and commitments to continue work, rather than announcing a large package of new treaties or defence contracts. Modi and Putin reviewed progress in bilateral economic ties and agreed to continue strengthening them. India’s PMO also highlighted implementation of the Programme for Economic Cooperation 2030. Both sides want to expand trade and industrial cooperation. A significant practical development was Russia's INNOPROM India industrial exhibition in New Delhi, held September 9–11, which the two leaders visited together.

Defence cooperation was reviewed, but the official readout does not announce a new major weapons contract or a specific new fighter/air-defence deal. Energy cooperation remains a major part of the relationship, and was among the sectors reviewed. Cooperation in space and other technology-related areas was included in the discussions. Civil nuclear cooperation was among the sectors discussed around the summit, although the official bilateral readout does not announce a new nuclear agreement. Critical minerals/infrastructure areas featured in reporting on the bilateral agenda, alongside trade, energy and technology.

Defence and oil-trade implications relationship is moving toward joint production, technology and industrial cooperation, rather than simply India buying finished Russian equipment.

The summit discussions covered defence cooperation, but no major new weapons package was publicly announced in the official readout. That means claims that the meeting itself finalized a particular new fighter, missile or air-defence purchase should be treated cautiously unless backed by a separate contract announcement. The bigger strategic issue is India's attempt to maintain Russian defence cooperation while simultaneously diversifying suppliers and increasing domestic manufacturing.

Russia remains important because India's existing military inventory contains substantial Russian-origin equipment, creating a long-term requirement for spares, maintenance, upgrades, ammunition and technical support.

India's Russian energy relationship has become one of the most economically important parts of the bilateral relationship since 2022. At the BRICS summit, energy cooperation remained part of the strategic partnership, but the Modi–Putin readout doesn't announce a new long-term oil contract or a specific new purchase volume. The significance is therefore less about a new deal signed in Delhi and more about keeping the existing energy relationship functioning despite geopolitical and sanctions-related pressures. Disruptions in West Asia and maritime routes were explicitly discussed by Modi and Putin because they affect energy security, maritime trade and Indian seafarers.

As of September 2026, reporting indicates that India's Russian crude purchases had risen substantially again after earlier pressure on the trade relationship. One recent analysis reported Russian crude accounting for more than half of India's oil-import basket by mid-2026, although that figure should be treated as an estimate rather than an official Indian government statistic.

The leaders then participated in the broader BRICS summit. The resulting New Delhi Declaration reaffirmed cooperation across political/security, economic/financial and people-to-people areas and emphasized reform of global governance and multilateral institutions.

That sequence is significant because India was simultaneously engaging Russia and China, while maintaining its separate relationships with the US, Europe, Japan, Gulf states and other partners. It doesn't by itself establish an India–Russia–China political alliance; the official documents describe cooperation in specific areas rather than such an alliance.

One particularly important takeaway of the Modi–Putin meeting produced continuity and deeper implementation, while the Modi–Xi meeting focused heavily on stabilising India–China relations and managing their differences. Those are related to the broader BRICS picture, but they were not the same diplomatic process.

India–China Bilateral Talks

At the BRICS Summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held bilateral talks on the sidelines of summit. The main points are:

• Both sides stressed that peace and tranquillity along the border are essential for improving overall India–China relations. They agreed that differences should not be allowed to turn into disputes and that the boundary question should be addressed through dialogue and negotiations.
• The two leaders emphasized that bilateral relations should be guided by mutual respect, sensitivity and mutual interests, with a long-term strategic perspective. Xi described India and China as partners rather than rivals.
• A major focus was the structural imbalance in bilateral trade. India wants greater access to the Chinese market and steps to reduce its large trade deficit with China.
• Both sides discussed making market access more predictable and addressing supply-chain concerns and trade barriers.
• The leaders agreed to encourage greater business linkages, trade and economic cooperation between the two countries.
• They discussed expanding cultural exchanges and mobility, alongside improvements such as the resumption of flights, easing of visas and the revival of the Kailash Manasarovar pilgrimage.
• Both countries agreed on the importance of continued institutional and strategic communication to prevent bilateral differences from destabilising the broader relationship.
• Leaders discussed the situation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), disengagement, de-escalation and maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border.
• Talks can focus on improving overall political and diplomatic relations.
• Issues concerning tourism, education, cultural exchanges and direct connectivity were also considered.
• India and China cooperated within BRICS and other international forums on issues such as development, climate change, global governance and reform of international institutions.
• Direct meetings between senior leaders helped maintain dialogue even when differences remained on important issues.

India–Iran Bilateral Discussions

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Iran President Pezeshkian had bilateral talks on the sidelines of BRICS summit. India emphasized the need for a peaceful diplomatic solution to the ongoing US–Iran conflict. Dialogue and negotiations should be pursued to reduce tensions, prevent further escalation and work toward ending the conflict. Key features of India–Iran talks are:

• India reiterated that disputes in West Asia should be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy, rather than military confrontation.
• Modi stressed the need for sustained efforts to establish lasting peace and stability in West Asia and prevent further escalation.
• India emphasised the importance of keeping sea lanes open and secure, particularly because disruptions in the region affect global trade and India's energy security.
• Given recent maritime attacks and casualties involving Indians, India specifically highlighted the safety and welfare of seafarers and protection of commercial shipping.
• The two leaders discussed strengthening the longstanding India–Iran partnership and cooperation in areas of mutual interest. Modi also appreciated Iran's continued high-level participation in BRICS despite the difficult circumstances.
• Both sides discussed cooperation through BRICS and the potential of the grouping to promote resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainable development in the Global South.
• The talks took place against a broader push within BRICS for greater trade and financial cooperation.
• President Pezeshkian advocated greater use of national currencies, reduced dependence on the US dollar, integrated trade and transport networks, and stronger investment cooperation among BRICS members.

The India–Iran talks centred on diplomacy over conflict, regional peace, freedom of navigation, maritime security and protection of seafarers, while also seeking to deepen India–Iran cooperation through BRICS and other multilateral platforms. India's approach reflects its effort to maintain strategic relations with Iran while protecting its energy security, trade routes and wider interests in West Asia.

Reaction of US President Donald Trump After The 18th BRICS Summit

Trump is likely to object to BRICS efforts to increase settlements in national currencies and develop alternative cross-border payment mechanisms. He has previously threatened very high tariffs against BRICS countries if they create or support a currency intended to replace the US dollar.

But the summit did not create a BRICS currency which is important. The 2026 declaration focused on interoperable payment systems and local-currency settlements, rather than launching a common BRICS currency or explicitly replacing the dollar. Therefore, Trump's reaction may be less severe than it would have been if BRICS had announced a common currency.

The BRICS declaration expressed concern about unilateral tariffs, non-tariff barriers and sanctions that affect international trade. Since Trump's administration has itself relied heavily on tariffs and sanctions, Washington is likely to view this as an indirect challenge to US economic policy.

The summit called for maximum restraint and diplomacy over the Middle East conflict, while Iran was itself a BRICS member participating in the summit. Given the ongoing US–Iran conflict, Washington may regard the BRICS position as insufficiently supportive of US objectives.

Trump's administration will also watch the strengthening of cooperation among China, Russia and Iran within BRICS. However, the grouping is internally divided, and India in particular has tried to prevent BRICS from becoming an explicitly anti-American alliance.

Trump is likely to distinguish between India's participation in BRICS and any concrete Indian action that directly undermines US interests. India's approach has been relatively pragmatic as it supports greater use of national currencies and alternative payment mechanisms but has not endorsed replacing the dollar.

Trump is unlikely to ignore the BRICS outcome, but he is also unlikely to treat it as an immediate threat to the dollar. The summit represents a gradual move towards a more multipolar financial and political system rather than a sudden attempt to overthrow the dollar-based order.

The likely US response would be a mix of economic pressure, diplomatic engagement and strategic caution. Trump may oppose BRICS efforts that reduce dependence on the dollar or challenge US sanctions and tariffs, while simultaneously seeking to prevent India and other BRICS members from moving into an explicitly anti-US bloc.

This is particularly significant because the summit avoided an explicit common BRICS currency, suggesting that India successfully pushed for a more incremental approach to financial diversification.

The writer is former Professor International Trade and a Defence Analyst & Commentator

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Sunday, September 20, 2026

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