As commendable as the indigenous development of light tanks by the Indian Army is, we need to be aware of the thorny path that lies ahead

by Kartik Bommakanti

The Modi government on 3 March 2022 announced the development of light tanks for the Indian Army (IA). This decision was taken under the Make-I category of the 2020 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and comes against the backdrop of India’s conversion of the K-9 Vajra mobile howitzer in to a light tank. A regiment of the K9-Vajra, which is a tracked 155mm/2 self-propelled howitzer capable of striking targets 50 kilometres away is now deployed in Ladakh in the ongoing stand-off with the Chinese. Further, deployments of the Vajra are likely in other parts of the Sino-Indian boundary. The K9-Vajra, however, was never going to be sufficient or a credible substitute for a dedicated light tank, which the government has now given an in-principle approval. The decision to deploy the Vajra was largely to meet the immediate military contingency facing India on its border with China and service some part of the firepower requirements of the IA. In terms of weight, the K9-Vajra is a 50-tonne tracked vehicle slightly exceeding the weight class of actual tanks such as the T-90 and T-72 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), which are also deployed in Ladakh. T-90s combat weight is 48 tonnes and the older T-72s weigh 46 tonnes. Both Russian-built MBTs are equipped with 125mm guns.

The decision to deploy the Vajra was largely to meet the immediate military contingency facing India on its border with China and service some part of the firepower requirements of the IA.

Notwithstanding their current deployment, the weight of the K9-Vajras, the T-90s, and T-72s make them much too heavy for effective combat at high altitudes along the Sino-Indian boundary. In any case, even if they were effective, their deployment imposes logistical burden on the IA, which the service for several years now has been trying to reduce. The Directorate General of Mechanised Forces has been working intensively to reduce the weight of weapons systems and platforms. Apart from that, the Chinese have designed and developed a dedicated light tank called the Type-15 and deploy them due to their suitability for high altitude warfare against India. The Type-15 weighs 35 tonnes with a 105 mm gun making it significantly lighter than the IA’s T-90, T-72, and K9-Vajras. It is one of the few light tanks built in the last three decades. It is widely recognised to be a capable armoured platform, despite its smaller gun size compared to its Indian counterparts. The Chinese built the Type-15 light tanks, because they anticipated the need for low-weight armoured platforms for high altitude warfare and specifically for the kind of military contingency confronting the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) presently against the IA along the contested boundary between India and China.

How The IA Got Here And Challenges Ahead

Against this backdrop, India had considered acquiring the Russian light tank the Sprut SDM1 following the outbreak of the current Sino-Indian boundary in May 2020. In April 2021, the Directorate General of Mechanised Forces issued a Request for Information (RFI) under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for 350 light tanks in the weight class of 25 tonnes. Notwithstanding Russia’s offer, India has now turned to native development of a light tank rather than import them. This development should be applauded, but without obscuring the problems plaguing force planning for India’s armoured corps. The public writ large should be aware that India’s pressing need and quest for light tanks only emerged in the wake of the current Sino-Indian boundary crisis. In India, a crisis invariably tends to tip the scales lending urgency to decisions on new developmental initiatives—the government’s decision on the indigenous development of light tanks is no exception. It is also the product of the IA’s constricted vision in meeting the capability and operational challenges facing India against its primary foe—the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Generally, the service has privileged medium to heavy weight armour over light armour. Pakistan has tended to disproportionately preoccupy the mind space of the IA’s planners. Consequently, the development of light tanks has not gained traction until the eruption of the present boundary stand-off with the PRC.

Irrespective of the merits of native development of light tanks, India’s decision-makers have to recognise that there could potentially be a minimum five-year lag before the country witnesses the emergence of the initial variant of a homemade light tank. Unless the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE), the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) Limited and presumably some private sector company—the entities most likely spearheading the incipient light tank project achieve a miraculous breakthrough in less than five years.

A crisis invariably tends to tip the scales lending urgency to decisions on new developmental initiatives—the government’s decision on the indigenous development of light tanks is no exception.

Regardless of the duration of the development cycle, which hopefully will not be too long, the IA must be clear right at the outset about the technical specifications which meet its combat performance and deployment requirements for a light tank to obviate needless delays. Otherwise, it will leave tank designers at the DRDO and its subsidiaries in the “dark”. The light tank project cannot be hobbled by past native development of armoured platforms such as the nearly 70 tonne—Arjun MBT. Shifting performance benchmarks by the IA has a precedent in the Arjun MBT, which the IA has inducted with some reluctance and under the government’s directives. Despite significant improvements in the MK-1A variant, it is an overweight tank and can only be deployed in “pockets” such as the desert areas along the India-Pakistan border. The Arjun has also experienced considerable cost overruns. The delayed and lukewarm integration of both variants—MK-1 and MK-1A of the Arjun MBTs by the IA also serves as a reminder of how not to proceed with the development of an indigenous light tank, because it could compel the IA and the government importing light tanks at the cost of an indigenous capability. A heavily-sanctioned Russia in the coming months and years will be a highly risky source of supply. If India turns to an alternative source, it still condemns the country to importing hardware, grating against the current and any future government’ intent to acquire military capabilities from India’s domestic defence industry. Finally, Indian decision-makers must ensure sustained funding, despite a turnover in government at the national level and closely monitor the Research and Development (R&D) and eventual production that involves all stakeholders in realising a credible light tank capability.